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When U.S. Supreme Court Justices decide a constitutional issue, are they
affected by the fact that the Constitution is extraordinarily hard to amend? Many
Americans and prominent scholars believe that Article V’s arduous amendment
procedures embolden the Justices because they know that unpopular
constitutional rulings are unlikely to be displaced by responsive amendments.
This is surely true to a degree. The Supreme Court has all but admitted that it
takes more liberty in overruling constitutional precedent because of Article V’s
rigidity. But scholars and constitutional designers have used the American
experience to develop more universal theories of constitutional design. These
theories posit that flexible amendment rules generally restrain courts and
onerous amendment rules generally empower courts. Political actors around the
world and within the American states have relied on these ideas in designing
their constitutions. They also animate calls for reforming Article V. It is
remarkable, therefore, that these ideas have not been fully theorized nor
systematically tested.
This Article fills that void. It organizes existing scholarship around a focused
and coherent theory explaining why judges might be influenced by amendment
frequency when deciding constitutional cases. It then presents findings from a
systematic empirical study testing that theory. The empirical study draws on an
original, hand-coded dataset of 5445 supreme court opinions from all fifty
states. Because state constitutional amendment rates vary widely, this dataset
provides a meaningful opportunity to analyze how judges practice judicial
review when operating under constitutions of varying degrees of flexibility. The
findings suggest that prevailing theories fail to accurately describe the
relationship between judicial review and amendment frequency. Many states
with high amendment rates also experience high rates of judicial activism, and
many states with low amendment rates experience low rates of judicial activism.
After accounting for other influences on judicial decision-making (such as
methods of judicial selection and retention, docket size, etc.), the data suggest a
surprising curvilinear relationship between amendment frequency and judicial
activism. In other words, there is a tipping point where judicial activism begins
to accelerate as amendment frequency increases. Contrary to prevailing
theories, high amendment rates are reliably associated with high rates of
judicial activism. This finding has significant implications for constitutional
design around the world because it suggests that there may be a cap on how
flexible a constitution should be for purposes of controlling the practice of
judicial review.
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INTRODUCTION
Scholars of comparative constitutional law routinely identify the U.S.
Supreme Court as one of the most activist courts in the world, even going so far
as to call it the head of an “imperial judiciary.”1 These characterizations are often
based on the perception that the Court decides constitutional cases with “little
fear of correction by constitutional amendment.”2 Indeed, it is commonplace in
constitutional scholarship to identify Article V’s rigidity as a cause of the
Court’s relative activism.3
This assessment is surely true to some degree. The Court itself has suggested
that it takes more liberty in overruling constitutional precedents because formal
amendments are “practically impossible.”4 But constitutional designers have
1

See AREND LIJPHART, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY 226 (1999) (ranking United States
Supreme Court, German Constitutional Court, and Supreme Court of India as most activist
courts from sample of thirty-six high performing democracies). See generally MATTHEW J.
FRANCK, AGAINST THE IMPERIAL JUDICIARY: THE SUPREME COURT VERSUS THE SOVEREIGNTY
OF THE PEOPLE (1996) (exploring Supreme Court’s imperial role as final constitutional
interpreter and Justices’ connected ability to act as “statesmen” in using constitutional rulings
to solve political or social problems).
2 John Ferejohn & Lawrence Sager, Commitment and Constitutionalism, 81 TEX. L. REV.
1929, 1961 (2003) (“[T]he Supreme Court, for a complex set of reasons substantially
attributable to Article V, does its work with little fear of correction by constitutional
amendment.”); see, e.g., LIJPHART, supra note 1, at 229 fig. 12.1 (associating strong judicial
review in United States with “constitutional rigidity”). There are, of course, indirect ways that
the Court’s power of judicial review can be “checked” by Congress and the President. See
Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 313-14 (2005)
(explaining that literature proving that Court is influenced by indirect congressional curbing
involves so-called separation-of-powers games).
3 See, e.g., Richard Albert, American Exceptionalism in Constitutional Amendment,
69 ARK. L. REV. 217, 224 (2016) (“[The] decelerating pace of formal amendment is paired
with a modern fact of constitutional law in the United States: constitutional change today
occurs ‘off the books.’”); Stephen M. Griffin, The Nominee is . . . Article V, 12 CONST.
COMMENT. 171, 172 (1995) (“Most commentators would concede that the Constitution has
changed a great deal through non-Article V means, primarily judicial interpretation.”). David
Strauss has argued that Article V is essentially irrelevant to processes of constitutional change
in the United States because the Court has brought about many meaningful substantive
changes through, among other things, the power of judicial review. David A. Strauss, The
Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457, 1459 (2001).
4 This argument was famously set out by Justice Brandeis in his dissent in Burnet v.
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405-07 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), and the
Court later endorsed it in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944). See generally Thomas
R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist
Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647, 727 (1999) (describing Justice Brandeis’s dissent and arguing
that, at that time, Court treated constitutional precedent same way it treated nonconstitutional
precedent). It should be noted that the Court has also suggested that Article V bolsters the
Court’s power of judicial review because it is the Court’s obligation to ensure that Congress,
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used the American experience to develop more universal theories of
constitutional design.5 These theories posit that difficult amendment processes
will generally result in more active judiciaries and that flexible amendment rules
will generally work to restrain judges.6
This general premise has come to dominate contemporary constitutional
design strategy. The Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, for
example, has issued “constitution-building primers” focused on designing
amendment procedures.7 One of these primers advises constitutional designers
that, “in general, the more difficult it is to formally amend the constitution, the
more likely it is that adjustments will be made through judicial interpretation.”8

the President, and the states do not rewrite the Constitution outside of the Article V process.
See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997) (in ruling that Congress did not
have power to enact provisions of Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Justice Kennedy wrote
for Court: “Shifting legislative majorities could change the Constitution and effectively
circumvent the difficult and detailed amendment process contained in Article V”); Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957) (“In effect, such construction would permit [presidential]
amendment of that document in a manner not sanctioned by Article V.”). This argument
assumes that political actors can realistically utilize Article V to bring about change. In any
event, under either approach, the availability or impossibility of amendment seems to
influence the Court’s decision-making.
5 The classic example is Donald S. Lutz’s 1994 article, Toward a Theory of Constitutional
Amendment, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 355, 357 (1994) (developing “theory that includes the
American version [of amendment] but also provides the basis for analyzing any version of
constitutional amendment” (emphasis added)). For an assessment of Lutz’s article arguing
that it relies solely on the U.S. experience for several key points, see John Ferejohn, The
Politics of Imperfection: The Amendment of Constitutions, 22 LAW & SOC. INQ. 501, 501-30
(1997) (reviewing Lutz’s article and noting that it relies heavily on evidence and perspectives
from United States). Lutz’s 1994 article was included (with minor updates) in his book,
DONALD S. LUTZ, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 145-82 (2006).
6 See Bjørn Erik Rasch & Roger D. Congleton, Amendment Procedures and Constitutional
Stability, in DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND PUBLIC POLICY: ANALYSIS AND
EVIDENCE 319, 340-41 (Roger D. Congleton & Birgitta Swedenborg eds., 2006); see also
LUTZ, supra note 5, at 148; Ferejohn, supra note 5, at 504.
7 INST. FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
PROCEDURES (2014). The primer is “intended to assist in-country constitution-building or
constitutional reform processes.” Id. at 1.
8 Id. at 13. The Venice Commission’s Report on Constitutional Amendment provides
similar guidance:
The more difficult it is to amend a given constitution, the more likely it is that calls for
change will be channelled into legal action, and the more likely the courts will be to
follow such invitations. This will in turn reduce the need for formal amendment. On the
other hand, in a system with flexible rules on amendment, the need for dynamic judicial
interpretation will be less, and so often also the legitimacy. The interaction and possible
mutual compensation effects between the two are complex, and clearly varies from
country to country.
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Donald Lutz’s seminal work also theorizes that a low formal amendment rate
empowers the judiciary to “dominate[]” the “process of [constitutional]
revision” and dispense with “theories of strict construction.”9
More importantly, however, there is evidence that constitution makers around
the world have actually used these ideas when designing amendment rules.10
Records from early-twentieth-century state constitutional conventions in the
United States show that several states made their amendment procedures more
flexible based on the assumption that this would restrain judges.11 Similarly,
constitutional designers in continental Europe and Latin America during the
twentieth century appear to have eased amendment procedures with the hope of
“curtail[ing] judicial discretion.”12 Recent calls for reform of the U.S.

EUR. COMM’N FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW (VENICE COMM’N), REPORT ON
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 22-23 (2009).
9 Lutz, supra note 5, at 358, 365 (theorizing these relationships and finding only “indirect
evidence” for proposition that infrequent formal amendment correlates with judicial
dominance and no evidence that courts dispense with methods of strict construction when
operating under hard-to-amend constitutions).
10 Historically, it seems that these ideas germinated from grassroots constitutional reforms
rather than academic influence. See Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, Constitutions
Unentrenched: Toward an Alternative Theory of Constitutional Design, 110 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 657, 657-58 (2016) (noting that most constitutional theory literature emphasizes that
“successful constitutions must not only constrain those in power, but must do so over long
time horizons,” but finding that this “does a poor job of depicting most other national
democratic constitutions, or even U.S. state constitutions”). Indeed, the theory of
constitutional design has lagged behind the practice of constitutional design. See id. at 67172. Nevertheless, constitutional reformers were initially attracted to flexible amendment
procedures because they thought that frequent amendment could constrain officials. See id. at
658.
11 See JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 37 (2009)
(quoting progressive-era debate at Kentucky Constitutional Convention: “Experience teaches
that when Constitutions are too difficult to amend, they will be changed in spite of written
restrictions”); id. at 48-51 (noting that amendment procedures were changed to be easier to
amend in part because judges were “creating novel interpretations . . . to overturn popular
legislation” and stating “Delegates also expected that the mere presence of a more flexible
amendment procedure would influence judicial behavior by permitting well-intentioned
judges to play a reduced role in updating constitutional provisions. The idea was that certain
judges had taken an active role in constitutional interpretation in part as a consequence of the
rigidity of the constitutional amendment process. These judges believed, understandably, that
they alone were in a position to perform the necessary updating of constitutional doctrines.”).
12 See Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 10, at 668-71 (discussing constitutional specificity
and flexibility as design strategies intended to restrain judges, arguing that constitutionmakers in twentieth century Europe adopted detailed constitutions and flexible amendment
procedures to “subject courts to popular control,” and finding that constitutional revision in
early twentieth century Latin America incorporated flexible amendment procedures to
constrain courts).
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Constitution have also focused on easing Article V’s requirements as a strategy
to enhance Supreme Court accountability.13 Indeed, scholars have found that the
dominant trend in contemporary constitutional design is to craft flexible
amendment rules with the goal of restraining courts and other officials.14
The real-world traction of these design strategies is striking because there has
been no systematic empirical investigation of the relationship between
amendment frequency and the practice of judicial review.15 To be sure, there is
anecdotal evidence that courts consider amendability when deciding
constitutional cases.16 It is relatively common for state courts, for example, to
point to amendment frequency as a reason to exercise judicial restraint.17 And,

13

See Jack W. Nowlin, The Judicial Restraint Amendment: Populist Constitutional
Reform in the Spirit of the Bill of Rights, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 171, 180 (2002)
(summarizing reform proposals aimed at restraining Court’s power of judicial review).
Sanford Levinson has suggested that Article V should be liberalized because its current
rigidity reduces healthy incentives for accountability and transparency by the Supreme Court
as well as other branches of government. See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 164-65 (2006) (describing Article V as “iron cage”). Concerns about the
institutional design of the Supreme Court and judicial accountability are not new. See Teresa
Stanton Collett, Judicial Independence and Accountability in an Age of Unconstitutional
Constitutional Amendments, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 327, 329-30 (2010) (arguing that people
have voiced these concerns since nation’s beginning). During the Founding Era, AntiFederalists argued that that the Constitution’s design would result in a Supreme Court prone
to lawlessness because it was without any check on its authority. See Brutus, XV, N.Y.
JOURNAL, Mar. 20, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 437, 438-39
(Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (contrasting Supreme Court’s unchecked authority with English
courts’ legislative supervision); Brannon P. Denning & John R. Vile, The Relevance of
Constitutional Amendments: A Response to David Strauss, 77 TUL. L. REV. 247, 276 (2003)
(arguing that Article V serves valuable “checking function” on Supreme Court although it is
used infrequently).
14 See Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, American Constitutional Exceptionalism Revisited,
81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1641, 1680 (2014) (“[C]onstitutional flexibility appears to be the prevailing
design strategy around the world. What is more, constitutional flexibility, under some
circumstances, can be a rational strategy to reduce agency costs.”); Versteeg & Zackin, supra
note 10, at 671.
15 See Ferejohn, supra note 5, at 525 (lamenting lack of empirical evidence on this issue);
Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 10, at 671 (noting that their research does not “evaluate the
postadoption effects of this design”).
16 See Jonathan L. Marshfield, Amendment Creep, 115 MICH. L. REV. 215, 243-49, 261-63
(2016) (collecting state and federal cases where courts explicitly mention amendment rules in
deciding whether to change constitutional status quo).
17 See, e.g., Hill v. State, 659 So. 2d 547, 554 (Miss. 1995) (Lee, J., dissenting) (“If the
people of Mississippi wish to provide convicted capital murderers with such a constitutional
right, then the citizens of this State, and not this Court, should amend our constitution through
the democratic process as has been done on many occasions.”); McFarland v. Barron,
164 N.W.2d 607, 615 (S.D. 1969) (Biegelmeier, J., dissenting) (“Reasons for liberal and
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as noted above, the Supreme Court has justified its more relaxed approach to
constitutional precedent by reference to Article V’s rigidity.18 However, there
has been no empirical investigation of whether courts are systematically
influenced by amendability when deciding constitutional cases.19 Indeed, John
Ferejohn has lamented that although it seems intuitive to assume that
amendment frequency has some systemic effect on courts, “this proposition is
one that we need to take on faith.”20 We simply do not know to what extent
amendment frequency actually restrains or empowers judges regarding
constitutional adjudication.
The dearth of empirical scholarship may be partly caused by the difficulty in
gathering reliable data on courts’ constitutional “activism.”21 Although there is

broad interpretations of the national constitution are not persuasive as to our state constitution.
The people have amended it and approved incurring added debt when they deemed it
necessary or desirable; in two instances they approved incurring debts of six (1920) and thirty
million dollars (1948). These actions confirm the observations made in the constitutional
convention debates in support of this limitation that our constitution was easily amended.”
(emphasis added)); Ex parte Lewis, 219 S.W.3d 335, 375 n.14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)
(Cochran, J., concurring) (“If a state’s citizens perceive the need for expanded constitutional
protection beyond that found in the federal constitution, they—the citizens—can amend their
constitution to provide those protections.”).
18 See supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also Marshfield, supra note 16, at 249-52
(discussing Court’s use of Article V in this regard).
19 There is, of course, a tome of literature on the relationship between formal and informal
methods of constitutional change. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
TRANSFORMATIONS 15-26 (1998) (arguing that constitutional change can occur through
constitutional moments of institutional conflict without any formal change to constitutional
text); Heather K. Gerken, The Hydraulics of Constitutional Reform: A Skeptical Response to
Our Undemocratic Constitution, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 925, 929 (2007) (discussing complex
relationship between formal constitutional amendment and informal amendment through
judicial interpretation); Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutionalism in the United States: From
Theory to Politics, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 37, 54 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) (explaining that binding
constitutional rules can be changed informally); Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments
and Constitutional Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 606, 612, 616-24 (2008) (discussing
Article V as “potentially optimal outlet for constitutional change”). As relevant here, this
literature emphasizes that legitimate constitutional change need not occur solely through
formal amendment processes and that judicial review can operate to informally amend a
constitution. See Griffin, supra, at 54. However, this literature does not focus on how formal
amendment frequency influences judicial decision-making or how to measure that impact,
which is my focus here.
20 Ferejohn, supra note 5, at 525.
21 In this context, I use “judicial restraint” to refer to opinions that resolve constitutional
disputes by ostensibly applying existing constitutional rules, and I use “judicial activism” to
refer to opinions that change constitutional rules by explicitly departing from existing
constitutional doctrine. STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & FRANK B. CROSS, MEASURING JUDICIAL
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much easy-to-collect data regarding constitutional amendment rates across
jurisdictions (especially state constitutions in the United States),22 there has been
no effort to gather corresponding data on courts’ constitutional rulings.23 This
lack of data has precluded investigation into whether variations in amendment
frequency across jurisdictions influence the practice of judicial review.
This article addresses that void. It presents findings from an original dataset
of hand-coded judicial opinions from all state high courts in the United States.
Specifically, my dataset captures all opinions from high courts in all fifty states
between 1970 and 2004 where a court actively changed constitutional law by
explicitly overruling existing constitutional precedent.24 I focus on cases that
overturn constitutional precedent because political scientists have identified
overruling behavior as one reliable indicator of judicial activism.25 Because state

ACTIVISM 121-22 (2009) (describing judicial adherence to constitutional precedent in similar
terms and noting that empirical studies of judicial activism are hard to conceptualize and that
data regarding judicial activism is difficult to gather).
22 The Council for State Governments, for example, publishes amendment-rate data
annually for all states. See John Dinan, State Constitutional Developments in 2014, in
47 COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 3, 11-12 tbl.1.1 (2015)
(listing number of amendments for all extant state constitutions).
23 There has been data gathered regarding the frequency and nature of Supreme Court
constitutional rulings. See THOMAS HANSFORD & JAMES F. SPRIGGS II, THE POLITICS OF
PRECEDENT 9-13 (2006) (summarizing scholarship on Supreme Court decision-making and
authors’ empirical research into Supreme Court precedent). However, these data alone are
largely unhelpful in studying the relative effect of amendability because they provide only
one point of reference for amendability: the U.S. Constitution.
24 The data are fully described in Section III.A and Appendix D. Significantly, my data
exclude cases where the court overruled constitutional precedent because of an intervening
statute, federal court ruling, or constitutional amendment that undermined prior precedent.
Thus, my data capture only instances of independent overruling by courts. This enhances the
data’s reliability as an indicator of judicial activism. It should also be noted that my data
capture opinions from all fifty-two state courts of last resort (Oklahoma and Texas have
separate high courts for criminal and civil matters).
25 See LINDQUIST & CROSS, supra note 21, at 44. I explain the strengths and weaknesses of
using overruling behavior as a measure of judicial activism in Section II.C. It is worth noting
here, however, that overruling behavior is an admittedly underinclusive measure of instances
where courts have changed constitutional rules or been active in their application of a
constitution. See id. (noting that law cannot always be easily reduced into quantitative metric
and that judicial activism cannot be easily measured). Courts can depart from existing
constitutional doctrine without explicitly overruling prior precedent by, for example,
recognizing new constitutional rights that courts have not previously rejected. See Burnet v.
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407 n.2 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (explaining
that significant changes in constitutional doctrine can occur without explicit overruling).
Nevertheless, due to the difficulty in systematically and reliably identifying such rulings,
political scientists and legal scholars recognize overruling behavior as one reliable indicator
of judicial activism, and I adopt it as my measure here. See LINDQUIST & CROSS, supra

2018]

THE AMENDMENT EFFECT

63

constitutional amendment rates vary significantly between states, my data
provide a meaningful opportunity to study the extent to which amendment
frequency may systematically restrain or embolden judges.26
To conduct this study, I first organize the existing constitutional-change
scholarship around a more focused and coherent theory of why judges might
behave differently when deciding constitutional cases under a rigid constitution
than under a flexible constitution. Drawing on the assumptions of “strategic
analysis” (a rational-choice approach to judicial decision-making),27 I argue that
prevailing theories are best understood as claiming that judges might be affected
by amendment frequency because: (1) amendments may be frequent enough that
judges anticipate an override threat to unpopular rulings (or infrequent enough
that they appreciate the absence of an override threat); (2) pressure for
constitutional change is great enough that courts anticipate political
destabilization if change does not occur through judicial review; and (3)
amendments are frequent and detailed enough to signal popular preferences to
judges, which raises the costs of making unpopular rulings.28
With this theoretical framework in mind, I analyze my data for evidence that
courts might be affected by amendment frequency. Under conventional theories,
one would expect to find an inverse relationship between amendment frequency
and judicial activism.29 In other words, high amendment rates should be
correlated in some way with low rates of judicial activism, and vice versa.

note 21, at 121-32 (using data from Supreme Court opinions explicitly overruling prior
precedent as “baseline measure of activism.”).
26 State constitutions are a particularly good sample from which to test this hypothesis
because amendment rates vary greatly between states. See Dinan, supra note 22, at 11 tbl.1.1
(listing amendment data for all state constitutions). Vermont, for example, has amended its
constitution only 54 times since it was adopted in 1793, resulting in an average of only one
amendment every four years. See id. Alabama on the other hand, has amended its constitution
more than 267 times since it was adopted in 1901 (excluding many local amendments),
resulting in an average of more than nine amendments every four years. See id. at 11-12 tbl.
1.1. Between these two extremes, there is great variety in state amendment frequency. The
median amendment rate is four amendments every four years and the average amendment rate
is just over five amendments every four years. See id. at 11-12 tbl. 1.1. The contemporaneous
diversity in amendment frequency allows for the collection of meaningful longitudinal data.
27 See Lee Epstein & Tonja Jacobi, The Strategic Analysis of Judicial Decisions, 6 ANN.
REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 341, 342-52 (2010).
28 I explain these hypotheses in Part II. My theoretical framework is a significant
advancement on current theories, which touch on many of these ideas but are frustratingly
vague and simplistic. However, I do not contend that my framework captures all of the ways
that amendment frequency might influence judicial review. Rather, my claim is that when
existing theories are viewed from the standpoint of strategic analysis, it is possible to articulate
more precise theories of how judges might be affected by amendment frequency.
29 See LUTZ, supra note 5, at 145-47 (describing relationship in roughly these terms).
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My data suggest that the relationship is more complicated than this. I find that
many states defy the traditional view. Alabama, California, Oklahoma, and
Texas, for example, all display relatively high amendment rates and incredibly
high rates of judicial activism.30 On the other hand, Indiana, Iowa, Vermont, and
Wyoming all have very old constitutions with relatively low rates of amendment
and judicial activism.31 Overall, my data suggest that prevailing theories are
oversimplified and they have not identified the true relationship between
amendment frequency and judging, if there even is a discernable systemic
relationship. Indeed, when looking at my data as a whole, the correlation
between amendment frequency and judicial activism shows a statistically
significant positive correlation, where judicial activism increases slightly as
amendment frequency increases.32
To better understand that relationship, I regressed my data over amendmentrate data and a series of control variables.33 The regression results show a
statistically significant nonlinear relationship between judicial activism and
amendment frequency.34 Specifically, the results show that although high
amendment rates are reliably associated with lower rates of judicial activism,
there is a tipping point where extremely high amendment rates are associated
with accelerating judicial activism.35 This suggests that there may be limits on

30

See infra Section III.B.2 (illustrating my findings, in Figure 2, regarding relationship
between amendment frequency and rate of overturning constitutional precedent). Appendix A
contains average annual amendment rates and average rate of overruling constitutional
precedent for each state. See infra Appendix A.
31 See infra Section III.B.2.
32 See infra Section III.B (illustrating this correlation in Figure 3; although the correlation
is positive (0.54) and statistically significant (p=0.0002), the r-squared for the fitted line using
linear regression is low (0.29)).
33 I replicate a negative binomial regression model (with both fixed and random effects for
the states) used by political scientists and legal scholars to separately identify reliable
predictors of judicial overruling behavior. See Stefanie A. Lindquist, Stare Decisis as a
Reciprocity Norm, in WHAT’S LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT? WHAT JUDGES DO, WHY THEY DO
IT, AND WHAT’S AT STAKE 173, 183 (Charles G. Geyh ed., 2011) (using negative binomial
regression model with fixed effects for states to predict overruling events by state courts); see
also Rosalind Dixon & Richard Holden, Constitutional Amendment Rules: The Denominator
Problem, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 195, 202 (Tom Ginsburg ed., 2012)
(using negative binomial regression model to predict amendment events by states). Section
III.B explains my use of the model in detail.
34 See infra Section III.B.2.
35 See infra Section III.B.1. Figure 4 (fixed effects) and Figure 5 (random effects) display
this relationship graphically based on predictions while holding all other variables at their
means. See id. The results from the fixed effects model predict that when amendment rates
surpass approximately 4.2 amendments per year, judicial activism accelerates. See id. The
random effects model predicts that judicial activism accelerates when amendment rates
surpass approximately 3.4 amendments per year. See id. The confidence intervals on these
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the use of frequent formal amendment to “check” the judiciary. My regression
also reveals that several other variables are reliably associated with judicial
overruling of constitutional precedent, including whether judges are elected in a
partisan election, whether there is a significant ideological shift on the court, and
whether there is a significant ideological gap between the median judge on the
court and the median voter. 36
Further research will surely be necessary before finalizing these conclusions
or attempting to extend them to other constitutional systems, especially in view
of the many different forms of judicial review around the world and a host of
other significant contextual factors.37 Nevertheless, these findings provide an
important step forward in understanding the real effect of formal amendment on
judicial decision-making. They suggest that designing amendment rules is more
complicated than previously thought and that the restraining effects of frequent
amendment may have limits.
In suggesting these conclusions from the data, I do not make any normative
claims about the virtues or vices of using formal amendment to affect judicial
decision-making. Nor do I make any normative claims about the appropriate
balance between formal amendment and informal processes of constitutional
change. My more modest goal is to shed light on how amendment frequency and
judicial decision-making may interact. My hope is that this information will spur
further empirical inquiry that can more accurately and reliably assist
constitutional designers in crafting amendment rules that suit myriad
circumstances and achieve diverse objectives.
This Article has four parts. Part I provides a brief background on strategic
theories of judging. Part II presents current hypotheses regarding the relationship
between amendability and judicial review and argues that these theories are best
understood as a strand of strategic analysis. Part III presents my empirical
methodology in creating an original dataset to test the prevailing hypotheses.
Part III also presents my empirical findings and demonstrates that my data tend
to contradict prevailing assumptions by identifying a curvilinear relationship
between amendment frequency and judicial involvement in constitutional
change. Finally, Part IV explores possible explanations for this relationship and
considers what my findings might mean for the field of constitutional design.
I.

“STRATEGIC ANALYSIS” THEORIES OF JUDGING

Judicial decision-making is an intriguing and complex phenomenon. Recent
decades have seen a “tsunami” of scholarship aimed at explaining how and why
predictions are rather large, but they nevertheless provide some indication of the complicated
relationship between formal amendment frequency and the practice of judicial review.
36 See infra Section III.B.2 tbl. 1, 2.
37 See generally Mark V. Tushnet, Alternative Forms of Judicial Review, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 2781 (2003) (describing strong- and weak-form judicial review and variations within
these forms).
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courts reach their decisions.38 In this Part, I describe what has become the
dominant approach to the study of judging: strategic analysis.39 I first describe
the core theoretical assumptions that characterize strategic analysis.40 I then
summarize key empirical findings testing whether judges are impacted by the
possibility that other political actors will override or disregard their rulings. In
the sections that follow, I argue that prevailing hypotheses about the relationship
between amendment frequency and judicial review are best understood as an
undertheorized and untested strand of strategic analysis.41
A.

Theoretical Assumptions of Strategic Analysis

The traditional legal account of judicial decision-making suggests that judges
“apply legal rules through methods that are objective, impersonal, and politically
neutral.”42 On this account, legal rules, logic, and case-specific evidence drive
outcomes.43

38 Epstein & Jacobi, supra note 27, at 342. See generally, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK
KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998) (arguing that judges’ decisions are motivated
by strategy, not just political preferences); WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL
STRATEGY (1964) (setting out strategic model of judicial decision-making); Lee Epstein &
Jack Knight, Toward a Strategic Revolution in Judicial Politics: A Look Back, A Look Ahead,
53 POL. RES. Q. 625, 625-61 (2000) (describing “strategic revolution” and recounting its
history as intellectual phenomenon).
39 See Epstein & Knight, supra note 38, at 625 (explaining that increasingly more scholars
are using strategic analysis to understand law and courts).
40 For this summary, I rely on the excellent overview of the field provided by Lee Epstein
and Tonja Jacobi. See Epstein & Jacobi, supra note 27, at 342-45.
41 There are important criticisms of strategic analysis, and alternative theories to explain
judicial behavior (such as the attitudinal approach). See generally, e.g., JEFFERY A. SEGAL &
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993). It is not my
purpose here to defend strategic analysis as the best approach to understanding judicial
decision-making. My more modest claim is that existing hypotheses regarding the relationship
between formal amendment and judicial review are best understood as forms of strategic
analysis, and, therefore, it is appropriate to test them using empirical models designed to test
analogous strategic theories.
42 Epstein & Jacobi, supra note 27, at 343; see also Charles G. Geyh, So What Does Law
Have to Do with It?, in WHAT’S LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT? WHAT JUDGES DO, WHY THEY DO
IT, AND WHAT’S AT STAKE 1, 7-8 (Charles G. Geyh ed., 2011) (arguing that scholars have
reached relative consensus that both law and politics influence judges’ decisions while
disagreeing as to degree to which law influences them).
43 See Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies That
Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895,
1905-07 (2009).

2018]

THE AMENDMENT EFFECT

67

Most scholars now recognize, however, that the reality of judging is more
complicated.44 Judges do not decide cases algorithmically or in isolation from
other relevant actors.45 Judging is often affected by institutional constraints that
are not particular to the case at hand. A trial court might, for example, be affected
by the likelihood of being overruled by a higher court.46 A majority on an
appellate court might limit the scope of their ruling to maintain the necessary
majority. And the Supreme Court might avoid issues where it is vulnerable to
executive or legislative overrides.47 All of these institutional considerations (and
many more) can impact how judges decide cases.
“Strategic” analysis seeks to account for those potential impacts by theorizing
and testing possible institutional influences on judging.48 To do this, strategic
analysis applies a strand of rational choice theory that assumes judges are goalorientated rational actors who operate in an “interdependent decision-making
context.”49 Stated simply, strategic analysis assumes that judges strive to render
decisions that are both consistent with their ideological preferences,50 and likely

44 See Epstein & Jacobi, supra note 27, at 342-43 (noting that strategic criticism of
traditional approach is commonplace); Geyh, supra note 42, at 8 (summarizing state of current
scholarship).
45 See Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard Posner, Why (and When) Judges
Dissent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 101, 101-03 (2011)
(describing self-interested judicial model in which judges consider factors such as their
reputation in deciding cases); Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?
(The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 1-4 (1993) (arguing that
judges make decisions that maximize their own utility, which includes income, leisure, and
judicial voting).
46 See, e.g., Kirk A. Randazzo, Strategic Anticipation and the Hierarchy of Justice in U.S.
District Courts, 36 AM. POL. RES. 669, 669-71 (2008) (finding evidence that federal district
court judges are influenced by fear of being overruled).
47 See generally H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE, AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT (1994) (explaining how Supreme Court Justices use certiorari
process to maneuver strategically to influence merits of cases); Mario Bergara, Barak
Richman & Pablo T. Spiller, Modeling Supreme Court Strategic Decision Making: The
Congressional Constraint, 28 LEG. STUD. Q. 247, 247-48 (2003) (exploring influence of
congressional preferences on Supreme Court).
48 Epstein & Jacobi, supra note 27, at 345-46.
49 Id. at 343.
50 “Ideological preferences” refers to the judge’s sincere belief about how a case should be
decided. Id. Strategic analysis does not assume any particular legal or judicial philosophy.
Some judges may adhere to a strict “rule of law” approach. Other judges may prefer a more
liberal judicial philosophy. Strategic analysis assumes only that all judges, regardless of
judicial philosophy. are affected by institutional considerations when finalizing their
decisions and that they seek to maximize their ideological preferences through the resolution
of cases. See id. at 344.
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to be honored and followed by other political actors.51 Strategic analysis is
grounded in the idea that judges are concerned with how their rulings will be
treated by other political actors.52 Not only do judges want to decide cases
correctly, they also want to maximize the likelihood that other actors will
comply with their rulings.53
Strategic analysis further assumes that to maximize compliance, “judge[s]
must attend to the preferences and likely actions of members of the elected
branches who could override or otherwise thwart their decisions.”54 In other
words, judges gravitate towards choices that other political actors will respect,
and judges avoid choices that other actors will likely thwart, while also seeking
outcomes that are most consistent with their ideological preferences. This is why
judges are likely affected by how reviewing courts may treat their opinions on
appeal,55 how colleagues may react to their votes,56 how likely a governor or
president is to implement a ruling,57 or how likely the legislature is to override
a decision.58
From these basic assumptions, scholars have theorized and tested a variety of
institutional constraints that appear to impact judicial decision-making.59 At the
Supreme Court, for example, there is evidence that Justices vote on the threshold
issue of whether to grant certiorari based, in part, on whether they believe that a

51 Id. at 344. In economic terms, judges are assumed to be “utility-maximizing” rational
actors. Id. at 345.
52 Id. at 344. In this respect, it is distinguishable from other “realist” approaches to judging,
such as the attitudinal model. Id. at 343.
53 Id. at 344 (“[T]he desire to issue efficacious decisions—those that reflect the judge’s
political values and that other actors will respect and with which they will comply—remains
the primary motivation in most strategic analyses.”).
54 Id. at 351 (discussing this strategy and noting that it may be unnecessary under certain
conditions).
55 See Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Strategic Judging Under the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines: Positive Political Theory and Evidence, 23 J.L., ECON. & ORG. 24, 25
(2007) (theorizing that federal district court judges make sentencing choices while keeping in
mind reaction of court supervising attendant appeal).
56 Epstein & Jacobi, supra note 27, at 343-44 (posing illustration of this dynamic).
57 The dynamics in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), are a classic
example of this. As Emily Berman has observed, “the genius of Chief Justice John Marshall
in Marbury v. Madison is that he established the power of judicial review without provoking
a confrontation with the Jefferson Administration—a confrontation the court was sure to
lose.” Emily Berman, Quasi-Constitutional Protections and Government Surveillance, 2016
BYU L. REV. 771, 826.
58 See Bergara, Richman & Spiller, supra note 47, at 267 (finding evidence that Supreme
Court reacts to fear of congressional override); Anna Harvey & Barry Friedman, Ducking
Trouble: Congressionally Induced Selection Bias in the Supreme Court’s Agenda, 71 J. POL.
574, 574 (2009).
59 See Epstein & Jacobi, supra note 27, at 345.
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majority of the Court will side with them on the merits if certiorari is granted.60
It appears that when Justices suspect that they are not in the majority, they often
vote to deny certiorari even if they disagree with the merits of the decision below
and would otherwise like to hear the case (the so-called “defensive denial”).61
Conversely, when Justices suspect that they are in the majority, they often vote
to grant certiorari even if they agree with the decision below (the so-called
“aggressive grant”).62
Judges can also act strategically by deciding cases with an eye towards the
broader, long-term policy implications of their opinions. Tonja Jacobi has
argued, for example, that Chief Justice John Roberts’s decision in National
Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius63 (the Affordable Care Act
case) was a strategic choice aimed at effectuating broader doctrinal change in
the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence.64 According to Jacobi, Chief
Justice Roberts agreed to uphold the individual mandate under Congress’s
taxing and spending power primarily because that choice enabled him to cobble
together a majority of Justices who agreed that the mandate was unconstitutional
under Congress’s Commerce Clause power.65
These are only two of many examples of the strategic approach to judging.
Scholars have used strategic analysis to theorize and test myriad other
institutional factors affecting judicial decision-making.66 It is not my purpose to
summarize all the literature. It is sufficient here to emphasize that strategic
analysis assumes that judges are affected by how others will likely react to their
decisions, and they favor outcomes that will maximize their preferences.67
There is, however, one particular strand of strategic scholarship that deserves
more discussion and to which I now turn. Various scholars have investigated the

60

See PERRY, supra note 47, at 45; Epstein & Jacobi, supra note 38, at 346.
Epstein & Jacobi, supra note 27, at 346.
62 See id. (explaining that Justices who vote for “aggressive grant” do so with intention of
giving ruling effect of Supreme Court affirmance).
63 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
64 Tonja Jacobi, Obamacare as a Window on Judicial Strategy, 80 TENN. L. REV. 763,
763-76 (2013).
65 Id. at 765-66 (“In a case that upheld congressional action, Roberts managed to forge an
opinion that dramatically read down both of Congress’s two main avenues of regulatory
power—the Commerce Clause and the Taxing and Spending Powers.”).
66 Scholars have tested, for example, whether judges act strategically to limit their own
workload to a level comparable to their pay. See Posner, supra note 45, at 10; see also
LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 92-95 (John Aldrich et al. eds., 1997).
67 It is important to note that strategic analysis does not necessarily assume that judges
consciously and deliberately consider institutional factors. Strategic analysis is not predicated
on the self-awareness of any particular judge. Rather, it assumes that the judicial function
inherently lends itself to these considerations, which themselves may be institutionalized in
judicial culture, custom, and practice.
61
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extent to which judges are affected by the possibility that higher courts or other
branches of government will override their rulings.68 I explore those theories and
findings in more detail because strategic “override” theories are very similar to
prevailing hypotheses about the relationship between amendability and judicial
review.
B.

Strategic Override Theories

Few institutional constraints are more intuitive than the threat of overruling
or thwarting a judicial opinion. It is understandable, for example, that trial judges
want to avoid reversal by a higher court. Similarly, it is understandable that
judges strive for opinions that will not be invalidated or side-stepped by the
legislature or the executive. This is not to say that judges always avoid decisions
that increase the risk of override. Indeed, it is possible that judges could
disregard the likelihood of reversal or override because of other strategic
concerns.69
Nevertheless, strategic scholars “almost uniformly” assume that judges seek
to minimize overrides as a way of furthering their ideological preferences.70
Although override theories vary, they share a common logic and set of
assumptions: (1) judges have sufficient information to accurately anticipate how
potential override actors are likely to respond to a ruling; and (2) when judges
anticipate an override, they act strategically to minimize its likelihood while still
pursing outcomes that maximize consistency with their ideological
preferences.71
To illustrate how an override theory might play out, imagine a judge faced
with three reasonable interpretations of an ambiguous statutory provision: A, B,
and C.72 The judge sincerely believes that interpretation A is the proper outcome,
but she knows that it conflicts with the strong preferences of the current
legislature, which has the power to change the statute. The judge is less keen on
interpretation B, but it is mostly consistent with the judge’s preferred outcome
and it is closer to the legislature’s current preferences. The judge completely

68

See Epstein & Jacobi, supra note 27, at 349-53.
See Mark Walsh, A Sixth Sense: 6th Circuit Has Surpassed the 9th as the Most Reversed
Appeals Court, ABA JOURNAL (Dec. 2012), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/
article/a_sixth_sense_6th_circuit_has_surpassed_the_9th_as_the_most_reversed_appeal/
[https://perma.cc/5N43-5XEL] (quoting Sixth Circuit Judge Gilbert S. Merritt, a “noted
liberal,” as saying that reversal by conservative Supreme Court could be “badge of honor”).
70 See Epstein & Jacobi, supra note 27, at 350.
71 See id. at 352 (explaining that courts react to potential overrides with “rational
anticipation followed by, if necessary, sophisticated behavior”).
72 This illustration is based loosely on the formal model developed by William Eskridge,
Jr. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President
Civil Rights Game, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 613, 643-50 (1991); see also Epstein & Jacobi, supra
note 27, at 353.
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disagrees with interpretation C, but it squarely aligns with the legislature’s
current preferences. Under these conditions, a strategic judge is likely to choose
interpretation B because it is the most consistent with the judge’s preferences
and also the least likely to provoke an override by the legislature, which would
result in something close to interpretation C—the worst substantive outcome for
the judge. Thus, the judge chooses option B to maximize both the substance and
effect of her ruling. Similar theories based on principal-agent theory apply to
how judges may assess the risk of reversal on appeal. 73
Another version of strategic override theory posits that judges mitigate the
effects of potential thwarting by issuing vague opinions.74 On this account, when
judges anticipate that other political actors might refuse to comply with a ruling,
they avoid issuing clear opinions that would draw attention to obvious
noncompliance.75 Instead, judges protect their authority by issuing vague
opinions that nevertheless retain the core of their ideological preferences (albeit
at higher levels of generality and abstraction).76 Although the vagueness enables
override actors to more easily side-step the ruling, the judge is spared the high
cost to her reputation and power that would follow from outright defiance.77 A
similar (but more extreme) strategy is for judges to avoid decisions altogether if
they anticipate a high probability of an override.78
Empirical studies have generally confirmed that judges in fact use these
strategies to limit the risk of override.79 For example, a 2008 study analyzed
5600 federal trial court opinions from 1925 to 1996 to determine whether trial
judges “anticipate responses by appellate panels and condition their decisions
based on these expectations[.]”80 The study found strong evidence that in many
areas of law “federal trial judges anticipate . . . negative response[s] on appeal”
when they perceive that an appellate panel is likely more liberal or more
conservative than their own ideology.81 An ideological disparity causes district
judges to anticipate an override, and consequently, to “curtail” expression of

73

See, e.g., Epstein & Jacobi, supra note 27, at 350.
Jeffrey K. Staton & Georg Vanberg, The Value of Vagueness: Delegation, Defiance,
and Judicial Opinions, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 504, 505-07 (2008).
75
Id. at 505.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 504 (“Vague rulings decrease the likelihood of compliance . . . .”); id. at 505
(“Vagueness can serve important political purposes in the relations between courts and other
policy makers.”).
78 Epstein & Knight, supra note 38, at 628.
79 See Epstein & Jacobi, supra note 27, at 349-53.
80 Randazzo, supra note 46, at 677-78.
81 Id. at 678-79 (using index of judicial ideology to measure disparity in ideology between
court of appeals panel and district judge).
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their own ideological preferences to avoid provoking reversal.82 Other studies
regarding criminal sentencing by federal trial judges have found that trial judges
are less likely to depart from sentencing guidelines, exposing them to greater
scrutiny on appeal, when they anticipate an appellate panel that is misaligned
with their own preferences.83
Many studies investigating the effect of Supreme Court review reach similar
conclusions.84 A 2010 study found evidence that court of appeals judges
anticipate Supreme Court review and conform their decisions to those
expectations.85 Appeals court judges are much more likely to treat Supreme
Court precedent favorably if, for example, the judges perceive the precedent to
be consistent with the Supreme Court’s current configuration and preferences.86
Conversely, appeals court judges are more likely to distinguish or criticize
Supreme Court precedent if they perceive the precedent to be out of step with
the Court’s current preferences.87
Empirical studies have also confirmed that judges react to anticipated
overrides or sidestepping by Congress and the President.88 In a seminal 2003
study, researchers found that when interpreting federal statutes between 1947
and 1992, the Supreme Court reliably “adjust[ed] its decisions to presidential
and congressional preferences” when there was an anticipated conflict between
the Court and the other branches.89 Various subsequent studies have confirmed
this core finding.90 Perhaps most significantly, the Supreme Court has shown a
tendency to use restraint in exercising the power of judicial review when there
is an ideological gap between itself and the House, Senate, the President.91

82

Id. at 669 (discussing how this practice occurs primarily in civil liberties and economic
cases but not in criminal cases).
83 Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 55, at 25-26 (using Democrat/Republican
appointment of judges and assumptions of political party preferences on criminal sentencing
to identify preference alignment); see also Epstein & Jacobi, supra note 27, at 350.
84 See Epstein & Jacobi, supra note 27, at 350-51 (citing Giles et al., The Etiology of the
Occurrence of En Banc Review in the U.S. Court of Appeals, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 341, 349-63
(2007); Jeffrey A. Segal, Chad Westerland & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Congress, the Supreme
Court, and Judicial Review: Testing a Constitutional Separation of Powers Model, 2nd
Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper (July 4, 2007)).
85
Chad Westerland et al., Strategic Defiance and Compliance in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 891, 891-95 (2010).
86 Id. at 901-02.
87 Epstein & Jacobi, supra note 27, at 350-51.
88 Bergara, Richman & Spiller, supra note 47, at 248-50.
89 See id. at 247.
90 See Epstein & Jacobi, supra note 27, at 354 (noting that “even Segal has (partially)
conceded the point” (citing Segal, Westerland & Lindquist, supra note 84).
91 Jeffrey A. Segal, Chad Westerland & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Congress, the Supreme
Court, and Judicial Review: Testing a Constitutional Separation of Powers Model, 55 AM. J.
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Finally, there is evidence that Supreme Court Justices also use the certiorari
process to avoid taking cases that would result in decisions at odds with
congressional preferences because Justices fear thwarting actions by Congress.92
In sum, there is strong evidence that judges anticipate and react to override
threats from reviewing courts as well as other branches of government. Judges
have developed a variety of strategies to manage override threats, but the
evidence suggests that judicial decision-making is affected by the risk of
override.
II.

THEORIZING THE EFFECT OF AMENDMENT ON JUDICIAL REVIEW

If judges are influenced by institutional constraints, and override threats in
particular, it is somewhat surprising that scholars of strategic analysis have not
examined whether constitutional amendments present an override risk that
judges anticipate and avoid. This may be because most strategic scholarship
focuses on the federal judiciary where the threat of an amendment override is
highly improbable.93 Nevertheless, comparative constitutional scholars
frequently assert that a constitution’s relative amendability impacts judicial
decision-making. 94 In this Section, I explore these assertions and argue that they
represent an undertheorized and untested version of strategic analysis. By
recasting these theories in accordance with the assumptions and logic of strategic
analysis, I articulate a more precise model of the relationship between
amendment and judicial review.
I first describe the basic legal parameters that frame the relationship between
formal amendment and judicial review. I then present the prevailing theories
from comparative constitutional scholars regarding the presumed interaction
between amendment and judicial review. I conclude by suggesting a more
focused account of the relationship between formal amendment and judicial
review that is informed by strategic analysis.
A.

Legal Framework

There are three legal constraints that structure prevailing hypotheses about the
relationship between amendment frequency and judicial decision-making: (1)
the doctrine of judicial review, (2) the principle of amendment supremacy, and
(3) the structure and operation of formal amendment rules. I briefly discuss each
of these before analyzing the prevailing constitutional design theories that draw

POL. SCI. 89, 90 (2011); see also Tom S. Clark, The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing,
and Judicial Legitimacy, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 971, 973 (2009).
92 Harvey & Friedman, supra note 58, at 589-90.
93 See Neal Devins, How State Supreme Courts Take Consequences into Account: Toward
a State-Centered Understanding of State Constitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1629, 1633
(2010) (noting that most strategic scholarship focuses on federal cases).
94 See infra Section II.B.
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on these constraints to explain the relationship between formal amendment and
judicial review.
1.

Judicial Review

At its core, judicial review is the power of courts to strike down legislation or
government action that is inconsistent with the Constitution.95 In its traditional
form, judicial review gives courts final say regarding the meaning and
application of existing constitutional provisions.96 This, of course, was the spirit
behind Chief Justice John Marshall’s famous declaration in Marbury v.
Madison, that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.”97 Judicial review establishes courts as the
supreme adjudicators of constitutional meaning.98
Although judicial review has its origins in American revolutionary political
thought,99 the doctrine is now deeply embedded in constitutional design and
practice around the world.100 Indeed, the vast majority of contemporary
constitutional democracies now practice judicial review in some form.101 That
is, most constitutional democracies entrust judges with the power of finally
resolving disputes regarding the meaning and application of existing
constitutional provisions.102

95 Tom Ginsburg, The Global Spread of Constitutional Review, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 81, 81 (Keith Whittington & Daniel Keleman eds., 2008).
96 See generally Tom S. Clark, Judicial Review, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
AND JUDICIARY 271 (Lee Epstein & Stefanie Lindquist eds., 2017) (providing very helpful
and insightful overview of judicial review); see also Tushnet, supra note 37, at 2784.
97 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
98 See Clark, supra note 96, at 274.
99 See Ginsburg, supra note 95, at 81 (discussing how few countries explicitly included
judicial review in their constitutions prior to World War II).
100 See David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States
Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762, 793 (2012) (“In 1946, only 25% of all constitutions
explicitly provided for judicial review; by 2006, that proportion had increased to 82%.”). The
Constitution of the Netherlands is a notable exception—it explicitly prohibits judicial review.
GW. [Constitution] art. 120 (“The constitutionality of Acts of Parliament and treaties shall
not be reviewed by the courts.”).
101 Law & Versteeg, supra note 100, at 793-95. Law and Versteeg distinguish between
American judicial review and European judicial review. Id. The salient differences are that
the American version involves courts of general jurisdiction that decide constitutional issues
only in the context of an actual dispute between interested parties (case or controversies). Id.
European review involves constitutional review by specialized constitutional courts and also,
sometimes, the resolution of constitutional issues in advance of any actual dispute between
parties (sometimes even before challenged legislation is enacted). See id. at 794-95. In both
versions, however, courts have final say regarding constitutional meaning and application.
102 There are many variations on how judicial review is practiced around the world.
See Clark, supra note 96, at 272 (discussing how France and much of Latin America view
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There are a few exceptions. Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom
have recently pioneered a new form of judicial review that allows legislatures to
effectively invalidate (at least temporarily) constitutional rulings by courts.103
Under this so-called weak-form of judicial review, procedures exist for
“ordinary legislative majorities [to] displace judicial interpretations of the
constitution”104 by declaring those rulings to be ineffective. Although the
procedures can be complex and nuanced, the basic idea is to allow for a
legislative override of the judiciary’s constitutional rulings.105 Despite this
pioneering development in constitutional design, there is evidence that the
legislative override is rarely used, especially in Canada.106 The override’s disuse
raises questions about the real significance of weak-form judicial review in
constitutional systems around the world. In any event, with the exception of
these few weak-form jurisdictions that may or may not practice a modified
version of judicial review, the dominant approach to judicial review continues
to entrust courts with the final say regarding constitutional meaning and
application.
Despite its prevalence around the world, there are well-known concerns with
judicial review, especially in its traditional “strong form.”107 Chief among them
is the worry that judges with “attenuated democratic pedigree” should not be
empowered to “displace decisions taken by bodies with stronger democratic”

judicial review differently than United States). Some countries entrust all judges of general
jurisdiction with the power to resolve constitutional disputes, while some countries have
created special constitutional courts to hear constitutional cases. Id. Some countries have
created writs (or causes of action) that allow individuals to appeal directly to courts regarding
individual constitutional violations. See id. (discussing France’s demanding procedural test
for who can bring constitutional challenges).
103 See Tushnet, supra note 37, at 2784-86; see also Rosalind Dixon, Weak-Form Judicial
Review and American Exceptionalism, 32 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 487 (2012) (arguing that
new broad powers given to legislatures have had little effect on countries’ power of judicial
review as it has rarely, if ever, been used).
104 See Tushnet, supra note 37, at 2786 (“[T]he mark of weak-form review is that ordinary
legislative majorities can displace judicial interpretations of the constitution in the relatively
short run.”).
105 See Lorraine Eisenstat Weinrib, Learning to Live with the Override, 35 MCGILL L.J.
541-71, 543 (1990) (describing Canada’s experience with this form of judicial review); see
also STEPHEN GARDBAUM, THE NEW COMMONWEALTH MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONALISM:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 9 (David Dyzenhaus et al. eds., 2012) (discussing how certain political
figures in Canada have vowed never to use legislative override).
106 See Richard Albert, Constitutional Amendment by Constitutional Desuetude, 62 AM. J.
COMP. L. 641, 669-73 (recounting declining use of legislative override in Canada and
suggesting that it may have fallen into desuetude).
107 See Zackin & Versteeg, supra note 10, at 659.
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pedigrees.108 To the extent democratic governance prioritizes decisions that are
responsive to popular will, judicial review could undermine democratic
governance by empowering judges to invalidate popular legislation.109 A related
concern is that judges may be especially tempted to abuse the power of judicial
review because it places courts above other branches of government and thereby
eliminates important checks on judicial overreaching.110 As explained below,
these “agency” concerns animate some of the existing theories regarding the
effect of amendment difficulty on judicial review.
2.

Amendment Supremacy

When courts exercise the power of judicial review and invalidate a law as
unconstitutional, they declare that law to be in conflict with a provision or
principle contained in or emanating from the Constitution. This means that the
court’s power to invalidate the law is entirely derivative of the Constitution’s
content. That is, if the Constitution did not conflict with the challenged law, the
court would have no authority to invalidate it. The important implication of this
is that if the Constitution is formally amended to resolve the conflict, then the
court’s ruling is necessarily undone.111 In that scenario, the amendment
supersedes the court’s prior ruling and the court must honor the amendment.112
Obviously, there can be ambiguities in determining whether an amendment
conflicts with a prior ruling, but amendment supremacy is a basic principle of
constitutional law recognized by courts.113
In Chisholm v. Georgia, 114 for example, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
Article III of the Constitution abrogated state sovereign immunity and granted
108 See Tushnet, supra note 37, at 2786 (explaining that weak-form review responds to this
concern); see also Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficult, Part
One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 335 (1998) (describing counter
majoritarian problem). There are other concerns with judicial review. Jeremy Waldron has
argued, for example, that courts are not especially good institutions for resolving rights issues.
See generally Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J.
1346 (2006).
109 See Zackin & Versteeg, supra note 10, at 659.
110 For the classic expression of this concern, see generally James B. Thayer, The Origin
and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893-94).
111 For a historical discussion of this principle and its theoretical significance, see WALTER
F. DODD, STATE GOVERNMENT 138-39 (2d ed. 1928).
112 Amendment supremacy is, of course, derivative of the more general rule that
constitutional law is supreme and trumps all other forms of law. See Jonathan L. Marshfield,
Models of Subnational Constitutionalism, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 1151, 1161-63 (2011)
(discussing constitutional entrenchment and supremacy in context of constitutional design).
113 See, e.g., John Dinan, Court-Constraining Amendments and the State Constitutional
Tradition, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 983, 1026-30 (2007) (collecting cases that affirmed doctrine of
amendment supremacy).
114 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
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federal courts jurisdiction to decide cases brought by private citizens against a
state.115 The Eleventh Amendment was adopted soon thereafter, and it provides
that the “judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit . . . against one of the United States by citizens of another state . . . .”116
Following ratification of the Eleventh Amendment, the Supreme Court has
unequivocally acknowledged that the Eleventh Amendment “eliminates the
basis for our judgment in . . . Chisholm v. Georgia.”117 State courts have also
frequently recognized and followed the principle of amendment supremacy,118
as have foreign courts.119
For present purposes, the doctrine of amendment supremacy means that
despite the awesome power of judicial review, courts can be “overruled” on
constitutional issues, and they know it.120 This constraint can impact judicial
decision-making in a variety of ways (which I discuss below).
115

Id. at 425.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
117 Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 253 (2011). In addition to
Chisholm and the Eleventh Amendment, there have been at least two other instances where
Article V was used to trump constitutional rulings by the Supreme Court. The Sixteenth
Amendment, which allows Congress to levy an income tax without apportioning it among the
states, was in direct response to the Court’s ruling in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co.,
157 U.S. 429, 607 (1895) (invalidating tax on municipal bonds because it equates to taxing
power of states’ instrumentalities to borrow money). U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. The Twentysixth Amendment, which ensured that anyone over the age of eighteen could vote, was in
response to the Court’s holding in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 118 (1970) (holding that
Congress “cannot set the voting age in state and local elections”). U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
For further discussion on this point, see generally Richard Albert, How a Court Becomes
Supreme, 77 MD. L. REV. (forthcoming), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2975832. As Albert notes, another more complicated example is how
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments undid Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
393 (1857). Albert, supra, at 3, n.6.
118 A.E. v. State, 743 P.2d 1041, 1045 (Okla. 1987) (“An amendment supersedes law
existing prior to its enactment.”); People ex rel. Williams Eng’g & Contracting Co. v. Metz,
85 N.E. 1070, 1074 (N.Y. 1908) (“We uphold the statute simply because the people have so
amended the Constitution as to permit such legislation. The command of the people made in
the form prescribed by law must be enforced by the courts.”).
119 See MAARTJE DE VISSER, CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN EUROPE 356-60 (2013)
(collecting cases from Europe where courts have acknowledged constitutional amendments
that effectively overruled prior court decisions).
120 See, e.g., A.E., 743 P.2d at 1045 (acknowledging that, in prior case, Oklahoma overrode
Supreme Court’s state law holding by amending its constitution). Courts do have tools to
strike back at responsive amendments. They generally have the authority to declare
amendments unconstitutional for failure to comply with amendment procedures. See WALTER
FAIRLEIGH DODD, THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 236 (1910);
G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 26-27 (1998); cf. generally YANIV
ROZNAI, UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS (2017) (explaining that some
116
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Formal Amendment Flexibility

The last relevant legal constraint is the structure and operation of amendment
rules. The key principle here is that constitutions have different degrees of
formal amendability.121 Some constitutions are very easy to amend, others are
very difficult, and others lie somewhere in-between.122 The relative flexibility
of a constitution can be hard to assess, but scholars generally recognize that
constitutional flexibility is affected by both the structure of formal amendment
rules and the political culture within which the rules exist.123 I discuss both in
turn before discussing recognized methods for measuring relative constitutional
flexibility.
Although all extant national constitutions contain explicit rules for formal
amendment, there is great complexity and diversity in how constitutions
structure the amendment power.124 For example, amendment procedures can
require special legislative majorities, ratification by both chambers of bicameral
legislatures, approval by subnational units (such as states, provinces, or regions),
and public referenda, sometimes with special majority requirements.125 A few
countries even require their legislatures to vote on proposed amendments, then
hold an election, and then vote on the amendments again.126 Adding to the
complexity, many countries provide more than one pathway to amendment by
allowing various different actors to initiate or ratify amendments, and some
countries distinguish between amendments and constitutional revisions.127 A

courts will invalidate procedurally perfect amendments by invoking doctrine of
unconstitutional amendment, which allows judges to review and invalidate amendments
based on their content).
121 See generally Richard Albert, The Structure of Constitutional Amendment Rules,
49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 913, 972 (2014) (comparing formal amendment rules in high
performing, democratic countries).
122 See id.; Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 14, at 1672-75 (illustrating relative amendment
rates).
123 See Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, Does the Constitutional Amendment Rule Matter
at All? Amendment Cultures and the Challenges of Measuring Amendment Difficulty,
13 INT’L J. CONST. L. 686, 699-701 (2015) (providing examples of countries where political
barriers to amending constitutions exist); Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 10, at 661 (noting
that formal amendment rules are “mediated so dramatically by political culture”).
124 See LIJPHART, supra note 1, at 218 (stating that “[d]emocracies use a bewildering array
of devices” for amendment).
125 Id.
126 See, e.g., Wim J.M. Voermans, The Constitutional Revision Process in the Netherlands,
in ENGINEERING CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 261, 261 (Xenophon Contiades ed., 2013)
(explaining that Dutch constitution fits this description).
127 See LIJPHART, supra note 1, at 218-23 (describing different types of legislative votes
and referendums).
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few countries also place subject-matter restrictions on certain amendment
pathways or declare particular provisions to be unamendable.128
Despite these complexities, various scholars have attempted to classify
amendment procedures to compare the relative rigidity of constitutions. Arend
Lijphart, for example, identified four amendment categories in order from least
to most rigid: (1) approval by ordinary legislative majorities, (2) approval by
two-thirds legislative majorities, (3) approval by less than a two-thirds majority
but more than an ordinary majority (“for instance, a three-fifths parliamentary
majority or an ordinary majority plus a referendum”), and (4) approval by more
than a two-thirds majority (“such as a three-fourths majority or a two-thirds
majority plus approval by state legislatures”).129
As Richard Albert has observed, Lijphart’s categories are helpful but
significantly oversimplified.130 They fail to account for myriad important
nuances in constitutional amendment rules that might affect overall
constitutional rigidity.131 Indeed, the “steps to passage” of a constitutional
amendment vary greatly, and it is hard to know which procedures are more
difficult than others.132 As Tom Ginsburg and James Melton have observed, “it
is difficult to evaluate whether a constitution that requires a 2/3 vote of the
legislature to amend the constitution is more or less flexible than one that
requires an ordinary legislative majority with subsequent referendum by the
public.”133 Constitutions with multiple amendment pathways further complicate
comparisons of rigidity.134 Constitutions with unamendable provisions or
subject-matter specific rules for amendment add an additional complexity to the
rigidity calculus.135 All of these variations in the structure of formal amendment

128

See Albert, supra note 121, at 950-52 (reporting subject-matter restrictions in
constitutional amendment procedures around the world).
129 LIJPHART, supra note 1, at 218-19. For an alternative catalogue of amendment
procedures, see EDWARD SCHNEIER, CRAFTING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACIES: THE POLITICS
OF CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 222-25 (2006).
130 See Albert, supra note 121, at 918-20.
131 Id.
132 Ginsburg & Melton, supra note 123, at 692. But see LUTZ, supra note 5, at 167-68
(developing index for estimating relative difficulty of amendment processes).
133 Ginsburg & Melton, supra note 123, at 692 (discussing difficulty of comparing
procedural arrangements’ flexibility ex ante).
134 See, e.g., LA CONSTITUTION COMORIENNE [CONSTITUTION] Dec. 23, 2001, tit. VIII, art.
42 (Comoros). (“The initiative of revision of the Constitution belongs concurrently to the
President of the Union and to at least one-third of the members of the Assembly of the
Union.”); see also Ginsburg & Melton, supra note 123, at 693 (discussing Finland as example
of alternative paths).
135 See Ginsburg & Melton, supra note 123, at 693 (providing examples of countries that
have these amendment procedures in place).
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rules make it very difficult to assess the overall relative difficulty of formal
amendment procedures.136
Political culture also likely influences constitutional flexibility. The classic
example is Japan.137 The amendment rules under Japan’s constitution impose
relatively low thresholds: amendments can be initiated by a two-thirds vote in
both legislative chambers and ratified by majority vote in a national
referendum.138 Despite this relatively easy amendment process, Japan has never
amended its constitution, but other countries with similar amendment rules have
amended their constitutions multiple times over shorter periods.139 Thus, as Tom
Ginsburg and James Melton have concluded, every society seems to have a “set
of shared attitudes about the desirability of amendment” that is “independent of
the substantive issue under consideration and the degree of pressure for
change.”140 Those attitudes create a “baseline level of resistance to formal
constitutional change” that affects amendment rates independent of the formal
processes for amendment.141
Because of the influence of political culture on formal amendment flexibility,
many empirical scholars recognize that constitutional flexibility should not be
measured solely by reference to the structure of formal amendment rules.142 A
better measure of constitutional flexibility is a constitution’s actual amendment
rate because this presumably captures both the formal barriers to amendment
contained in the amendment rules as well as cultural attitudes regarding formal
amendment.143
But counting amendments across constitutional systems presents its own
difficulties:

136

But see Albert, supra note 121, at 913-14 (offering sophisticated catalogue of
amendment categories that account for many of these variations).
137 See Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 10, at 661.
138 NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 96 (Japan); see also Versteeg &
Zackin, supra note 10, at 661 (explaining that this is low threshold).
139 See Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 10, at 661. Examples of countries with similar
amendment procedures include: Albania (one amendment since adoption in 1998), Paraguay
(one amendment since adoption in 1992), and Peru (six amendments since adoption in 1993).
See Schneier, supra note 129, at 224-25 (outlining procedures).
140 Ginsburg & Melton, supra note 123, at 697; see also Rosalind Dixon, Constitutional
Amendment Rules: A Comparative Perspective, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 96,
107 (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011) (“Popular attitudes toward a
constitution . . . have a clear potential to influence the practical difficulty of constitutional
amendment.”).
141 See Ginsburg & Melton, supra note 123, at 699.
142 See, e.g., Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 10, at 661 (explaining that formal amendment
rules “are mediated so dramatically by political norms”).
143 See, e.g., id.
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Sometimes amendments are adopted as a “package,” which can increase
the total number of constitutional amendments even though the system
experienced only one true amendment “event.” The adoption of the Bill of
Rights in the United States illustrates this. Some amendments are also
adopted pro forma because they make relatively minor changes to the text,
which raises questions regarding whether they should be included equally
in the constitution’s true amendment “count.”144
To address these issues, some empirical studies calculate amendment rates based
on the number of years that a constitution was amended rather than the number
of actual amendments, 145 but this is far from a perfect approach. Sometimes
constitutions experience multiple changes at the same time that should be
independently counted, and counting only amendment years can omit these
changes.146
In any event, it is clear that constitutions vary in their degree of formal
amendment flexibility, and amendment rates (of some kind) are a recognized
measure of that flexibility.147
B.

Existing Theories Regarding Amendment Difficulty and Judicial Review

In view of the above legal framework, constitutional design scholars have
articulated at least three theories for why they believe amendment difficulty
likely impacts judicial restraint. I explore each of these and argue that they are,
in fact, an undertheorized and untested strand of “strategic analysis.” I then
144

Jonathan L. Marshfield, Decentralizing the Amendment Power, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 963, 1016-17 (2015) (footnotes omitted) (citing Harry L. Witte, Rights, Revolution, and
the Paradox of Constitutionalism: The Processes of Constitutional Change in Pennsylvania,
3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 383, 396 (1993) (describing Bill of Rights as effectively one amendment
event); Law & Versteeg, supra note 100, at n.87; Rasch & Congleton, supra note 6, at 333).
This issue also arises when a constitutional law is adopted that makes a series of changes to
the text in order to achieve a singular change in the overall constitutional system. See, e.g.,
Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Act of 2012 (S. Afr.) (making various textual changes
to constitution to effectuate singular purpose of reorganizing judiciary). If these textual
changes are counted individually, the amendment rate is artificially inflated. See id.
145 See, e.g., Dixon & Holden, supra note 33, at 195; Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 10, at
661; see also ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF
NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 102 n.8 (2009) (“Years, as opposed to number, of amendments is
probably the best way to validate amendment flexibility, because amendments (such as the
first ten in the United States) are often passed in clusters with similar levels of support across
items in the cluster.”). There are alternative approaches. Lutz famously created an index of
amendment difficulty. Lutz, supra note 5, at 10-16; see also Ginsburg & Melton, supra note
123, at 698 (tabulating various approaches to measuring amendment difficulty).
146 As explained below, there is good reason to believe that this happens frequently in the
amendment of state constitutions.
147 See Lutz, supra note 5, at 355 (emphasizing that amendment rates and not number of
amendments is key indicator).
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consolidate these theories into a series of hypotheses framed from the
perspective of strategic analysis so as to capture more concretely why current
theories expect an inverse relationship between amendment frequency and
judicial activism.
1.

The “Hydraulics” Theory148

Drawing on descriptive accounts of constitutional change in the United States,
scholars have suggested that rigid constitutional texts put pressure on courts to
bring about constitutional change through judicial review.149 Because these
theories grow out of the American experience, I first summarize descriptive
theories regarding U.S. constitutional change and then examine how those
theories have been extrapolated into general theories of constitutional design.
The Framers of the U.S. Constitution very likely believed that constitutional
change should occur exclusively through the formal amendment procedures
outlined in Article V.150 However, as pressure for constitutional change
mounted, and Article V became increasingly unworkable, political actors found
other ways to reform constitutional rules.151 Bruce Ackerman has argued, for
example, that as early as 1860 constitutional change began to shift away from
Article V and toward informal processes.152 Indeed, I suspect that most scholars

148 I hijack this description from Heather K. Gerken’s important article, The Hydraulics of
Constitutional Reform: A Skeptical Response to Our Undemocratic Constitution, supra note
19.
149 See Albert, supra note 3, at 224 (“[T]his decelerating pace of formal amendment is
paired with a modern fact of constitutional law in the United States: constitutional change
today occurs ‘off the books.’” (citation omitted)); Griffin, supra note 3, at 172 ( “Most
commentators would concede that the Constitution has changed a great deal through nonArticle V means, primarily judicial interpretation.”). The U.S. experience has been used to
support or explain broader applications of this principle. See, e.g., Stephen Holmes & Cass R.
Sunstein, The Politics of Constitutional Revision in Eastern Europe, in RESPONDING TO
IMPERFECTION 275, 276-80 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) (exploring how some lessons from
U.S. experience with Article V might inform constitution making in Eastern Europe in 1990s);
see also, e.g., LIJPHART, supra note 1, at 228-29 (discussing relationship between
constitutional rigidity and judicial review).
150 See Richard Albert, Constitutional Disuse or Desuetude: The Case of Article V, 94 B.U.
L. REV. 1029, 1030 (2014) (arguing that this formalist interpretation no longer exists). Indeed,
Richard Albert has pointed out that this was the “settled” position during the early years of
the republic. Id. (citing Harry Pratt Judson, The Essentials of a Written Constitution, in
4 UNIV. OF CHI., THE DECENNIAL PUBLICATIONS 313, 320 (1903)).
151 See id.; Aziz Z. Huq, The Function of Article V, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1165, 1180-85
(2014) (providing helpful summary of literature on “informal amendment solution”).
152 Bruce A. Ackerman, Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1065 (1984).
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now agree that federal constitutional change occurs mostly through informal
processes and not through Article V amendments.153
The primary reasons for this shift toward informal amendment processes are
Article V’s arduous amendment requirements.154 Because the passing of time
necessarily brings pressure for constitutional reform, and because Article V’s
amendment rules make formal amendment an unrealistic option for addressing
those needs,155 political actors have found other ways to secure necessary
constitutional change.156 Judicial review by the Supreme Court has become a
dominant force in this regard.157 As Congress, the President, and the states push
the boundaries of old constitutional rules, the Supreme Court is presented with
constitutional challenges to those actions. Those cases provide the Court with
opportunities to either impede change by enforcing existing constitutional rules
or bring about constitutional change by establishing (or at least “ratifying”)
updated constitutional requirements.158 Because the Court sees no alternative
153 See, e.g., Rosalind Dixon, Partial Constitutional Amendments, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
643, 651-64 (2011) (demonstrating empirically that Article V’s amendment rules have
become more difficult over time because of shifting political majorities, addition of new
states, and demographic changes); Griffin, supra note 3, at 173.
154 See Griffin, supra note 3, at 172-73 (noting proposed amendments such as 1972 Equal
Rights amendment that would have passed if not for requiring supermajority of state
legislatures to ratify amendments). Many scholars have identified Article V as containing one
of the most rigid amendment rules in the world. See LUTZ, supra note 5, at 170 (noting selected
cross-national data identified Australia as only country with lower amendment rate than
United States); Dixon, supra note 153, at 651-64. Article V requires amendments to be
initiated by either two-thirds majorities in both houses of Congress or by the states at a
convention called by two-thirds of the states. U.S. CONST. art. V. Amendments proposed by
either method must then be ratified by three-quarters of the states. Id.
155 See Rosalind Dixon, Updating Constitutional Rules, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 319, 321
(“[C]hanges in social circumstances and understandings over time mean that, from a
contemporary perspective, a number of core constitutional rules are now no longer optimal.”).
156 See Bruce A. Ackerman, Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1065-70
(1984) (discussing importance of overwhelming Republican majority elected in 1866 in
passing Fourteenth Amendment through de facto constitutional convention).
157 See Dixon, supra note 155, at 319 (“In the United States, the dominant mode of
‘updating’ constitutional meaning is via a process of judicial interpretation.”). Other
institutions are involved with informal constitutional change as well. See Huq, supra note
151, at 1180-85 (explaining Congress-centered theories of informal constitutional change).
158 See ELKINS, GINSBURG & MELTON, supra note 145, at 163 (“Judicial review (as well as
evolution of popular understandings) has provided a mechanism for updating the Constitution,
thus ensuring that its allegedly timeless principles are applied to modern realities . . . .”);
Strauss, supra note 3, at 1473 (explaining how Supreme Court rulings can operate as de facto
ratification of informal constitutional change). The Court’s rulings in McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. 316 (1819), and Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1923), are oft cited examples of this.
Strauss, supra note 3, at 1473 (noting “it seems fair to say that Crowell essentially ratified a
fait accompli” and also discussing McCulloch). Something similar appears to have occurred
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process for bringing about necessary constitutional change, it succumbs to the
pressure that has been redirected from Article V to the Court and assumes an
active role in constitutional change.159
Although these explanations are compelling in their efforts to describe
constitutional change in the United States, they are mostly descriptive. That is,
they do not purport to provide a general theory for the design of amendment
rules. Donald Lutz’s ground-breaking 1994 article, Toward a Theory of
Constitutional Amendment, sought to do just that. Lutz took up the task of
“developing a theory that includes the American version [of amendment] but
also provides the basis for analyzing any version of constitutional
amendment.”160 Lutz explained that his intent was “to provide guidelines for
constitutional design in any context—guidelines that will allow framers to link
the design of a formal amendment process securely to desired outcomes.”161
Thus, Lutz’s project shifted the study of constitutional change from mostly
descriptive accounts of change in the United States to more general theories of
constitutional design.
In constructing his theory, Lutz first articulated several hypotheses regarding
the design of amendment rules. First, he hypothesized that:
Every political system needs to be modified over time as a result of some
combination of (1) changes in the environment within which the political
system operates (including economics, technology, foreign relations,
demographics, etc.); (2) changes in the value system distributed across the
population; (3) unwanted or unexpected institutional effects; and (4) the
cumulative effect of decisions made by the legislature, executive, and
judiciary.162
Second, he reasoned that all constitutions must therefore change or they will
die.163 He further reasoned that if constitutional change is inevitable, then longlasting constitutions that are amended infrequently are likely characterized by
constitutional change through judicial review.164 He added: “The more

in state constitutions before the relaxation of amendment rules. See DINAN, supra note 11, at
50-51 (explaining state judges’ perception of rigid amendment rules).
159 See DINAN, supra note 11, at 50-51.
160 Lutz, supra note 5, at 357 (emphasis added) (“The intent of the analysis is to provide
guidelines for constitutional design in any context—guidelines that will allow framers to link
the design of a formal amendment process securely to desired outcomes.”).
161 Id.
162 Id. at 357.
163 See id. at 357 (“All constitutions require regular, periodic modification, whether
through amendment, judicial or legislative alteration, or replacement.”).
164 Id. at 358; see also ELKINS, GINSBURG & MELTON, supra note 145, at 83 (“[T]he
existence of some method for adjustment to changing conditions over time forestalls pressure
for more total revision.”).
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important the role of the judiciary in constitutional revision, the less likely the
judiciary is to use theories of strict construction.”165
Lutz tested some of his claims empirically. Using data from all fifty state
constitutions as well as thirty-two national constitutions, he showed that the
formal structure of amendment rules impacts amendment frequency.166 He also
found that constitutions tend to survive longer if they are amended at a
“moderate rate” and they tend to die sooner if they are amended too frequently
or infrequently.167 He did not, however, gather data or attempt to test whether
amendment frequency (or difficulty) actually correlates with higher degrees of
judicial activism in bringing about constitutional change.168 Indeed, subsequent
researchers have expressed “disappointment” at the lack of evidence to support
this hypothesis, and they have concluded that Lutz’s “argument largely rests on
the observation that the United States has both a low amendment rate and a
judiciary that uses interpretive means to effect constitutional change.”169
Subsequent empirical studies of constitutional change have relied on Lutz’s
basic assumptions but have not tested whether amendment difficulty has
systematic effects on the practice of judicial review. Indeed, prominent empirical
studies of constitutional change tend to recognize the role that courts can play in
constitutional change but do not seek to measure judicial involvement in
constitutional change with great specificity.
For example, in the groundbreaking work The Endurance of National
Constitutions, Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and James Melton study the
relationship between constitutional rigidity (among other things) and
constitutional endurance.170 Their study draws on data from 935 constitutions
165

Lutz, supra note 5, at 358. Lutz’s theory was groundbreaking as an attempt to
generalize a theory of amendment, but his core hypotheses were obviously derivative of the
American experience with Article V. See Ferejohn, supra note 5, at 501-03 (making this
criticism).
166 See Lutz, supra note 5, at 358-65 (detailing methodology and results of empirical
analysis). Lutz’s analysis and findings have been challenged. See Ferejohn, supra note 5, at
521-26; Huq, supra note 151, 1176-77.
167 Lutz, supra note 5, at 365 (concluding empirical evidence shows that rate between 0.75
to 1.25 amendments per year encourages constitutional longevity).
168 Id. Lutz seems to have found support for this claim by inference from his observation
that some constitutions last for long periods of time without many formal amendments. Id.
Because Lutz assumes that all constitutions must change or die, and because he assumes that
constitutional change occurs through either formal amendment or judicial review, he
concludes that rigid constitutions affect how courts practice judicial review. Id. (“In the
absence of further research, there is only indirect evidence for this proposition. Table 6 shows
that the lower the rate of amendment, the less the legislature dominates. The executive is
usually not a major actor in a formal amendment process, so we are left with the judiciary.”).
169 See Ferejohn, supra note 5, at 525.
170 See ELKINS, GINSBURG & MELTON, supra note 145, at 99-103 (comparing Columbian
Constitution’s flexible amendment rules and Article V’s rigid amendment rules).
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operating between 1789 and 2006.171 While recognizing the role that judicial
review can play in constitutional change, Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton include
only a binary variable for judicial review that captured whether there was a
“judicial body entitled to conduct constitutional review.”172 Their model did not
otherwise quantify the impact of judicial review on constitutional change.173
Similarly, Arend Lijphart’s seminal study of thirty-six constitutional
democracies from 1945 to 1996 recognized that “[t]he impact of judicial review
depends only partly on its formal existence and much more vitally on the vigor
and frequency of its use by courts.”174 However, to account for this, Lijphart
ranked countries on a four-point scale without much explanation as to how he
assigned the points or how he assessed the relative strength of judicial review.175
There is some oft overlooked anecdotal evidence to suggest that the
hydraulics theory is oversimplified. Michael Besso, for example, has found that
the states used informal amendment processes to restructure gubernatorial power
under state constitutions during the early twentieth century.176 Besso notes that
this is surprising under the prevailing hydraulics theory because, unlike with the
Federal Constitution, formal amendment was a realistic pathway for these state
constitutional reforms.177 Gabriel Negretto has reported something similar from

171

Id. at 48-51.
Id. at 109. Similarly, Law and Versteeg account for judicial review in their comparative
study by using a binary variable capturing whether countries use “European model of abstract
review by specialized courts” or “American model of concrete review by ordinary courts.”
Law & Versteeg, supra note 100, at 795-96. Like Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton, they do not
attempt to measure the real impact of judicial review on constitutional change, but only to
report its existence in two alternative forms.
173 See ELKINS, GINSBURG & MELTON, supra note 145, at 126-29 (explaining methodology
and approach).
174 LIJPHART, supra note 1, at 225.
175 See id. at 225-28. Lijphart provides no explanation that I can find for this. He seems to
have made determinations based on anecdotal secondary sources commenting on each court’s
relative activism. See id.
176 See Michael Besso, Constitutional Amendment Procedures and the Informal Political
Construction of Constitutions, 67 J. POL. 69, 81 (2005) (tracing how various states
reorganized state executive power through statutes rather than formal amendment).
177
See id. at 71, 80-83 (noting that four states with similarly difficult amendment
procedures chose to reorganize state administrative agencies by statute). Ernest Bartley and
James Gardner have also documented anecdotal instances of informal constitutional change
in the states that challenge hydraulics theory’s underlying assumptions. See Ernest R. Bartley,
Methods of Constitutional Change, in STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 21, 22-23
(W. Brooke Graves ed., 1960) (“[T]here has sometimes been a tendency to ignore
interpretation as a medium of state constitutional change.”); James A. Gardner, PracticeDriven Changes to Constitutional Structures of Governance, 69 ARK. L. REV. 335, 353-64
(2016) (arguing that informal change through “practice-drive” methods has occurred in New
York “on an astonishing scale”).
172

2018]

THE AMENDMENT EFFECT

87

several Latin American countries.178 Negretto found that amendment frequency
was not an especially reliable indicator of judicial involvement in constitutional
change.179 According to Negretto, the “crucial variables” that better “capture the
importance of judicial interpretation as a mechanism of constitutional change
are the scope, access, and effects of constitutional adjudication.”180
Notwithstanding the lack of systematic empirical support for the idea that
amendment difficulty has a deep effect on judicial review, the hydraulics theory
continues to influence constitutional design. The prevailing design assumption
remains that when constitutional provisions are difficult to amend and
“constitutional courts have final authority over the interpretation of such
provisions, entrenchment does not actually inhibit alterations,” but rather “shifts
the locus of change—and the power to determine the legitimate scope of
mutability—away from legislatures and toward the court.”181 Indeed, the
proliferation of explicitly unamendable provisions in constitutions around the
world seems to be partly motivated by the assumption that in making those
provisions unamendable, courts will necessarily take up the task of updating
those provisions to preserve their relevance.182
In sum, the hydraulic theory suggests that low amendment rates over long
periods of time empower courts because pressures for constitutional change find
an outlet in the courts as the only real avenue for bringing about constitutional
change. However, there is an absence of any rigorous systematic testing of this
hypothesis.
2.

The Principal-Agent Theory

Various scholars have suggested that the amendment power serves a
“checking function” on the judiciary because it provides the “people” with the
opportunity to override court rulings.183 These theories of amendment design are
based on principal-agent ideas.184 Although judicial review is intended to reduce
agency costs by empowering courts to enforce constitutional commitments on
elected officials,185 courts can themselves be a source of agency costs if they

178 See Gabriel L. Negretto, Replacing and Amending Constitutions: The Logic of
Constitutional Change in Latin America, 46 L. & SOC. REV. 749, 761-62 (2012).
179 See id. at 760.
180 Id. at 762.
181 MELISSA SCHWARTZBERG, DEMOCRACY AND LEGAL CHANGE 184 (Adam Przeworski
ed., 2007).
182 See id. at 185.
183 See, e.g., Albert, supra note 121, at 913; Denning & Vile, supra note 13, at 276 (noting
that four of twenty-seven amendments to U.S. Constitution were ratified either to overturn or
react to Supreme Court decisions); Dixon, supra note 140, at 98.
184 See Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 10, at 660-61 (explaining development of flexible
constitutions in terms of principal-agent theory).
185 See id.
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divert the power of judicial review for their own purposes or act inconsistently
with the people’s constitutional preferences. This “rent-seeking” can be
especially concerning in the context of judicial review because constitutional
rulings are entrenched beyond the realm of ordinary political accountability.
Formal amendment can therefore serve a corrective function by establishing a
process for the people to correct the court’s acts as unfaithful agents.186 As an
extension of this, if amendments are easy to obtain, courts will presumably be
more accountable to the people’s preferences. Conversely, if amendments are
difficult to obtain, courts may be more likely to use judicial review for their own
purposes.187
Proponents of principal-agent theories of amendment design tend to point to
anecdotal examples of reprisal amendments to show that the amendment power
can check the judiciary.188 Brannon Denning and John Vile, for example, point
out that of the twenty-seven amendments to the U.S. Constitution, “at least four
were ratified to overturn, or in reaction to, a specific Supreme Court decision.”189
Similarly, John Dinan has found that states have a long tradition of amending
their constitutions in response to unpopular state court rulings.190 Those “court-

186

See Dixon, supra note 140, at 98 (providing helpful summary of principal-agent ideas
as applied to flexible constitutional amendment).
187 This is not to suggest that the dynamics in overriding a court ruling are simple and easy
to predict. In fact, the path to a responsive amendment is very politically risky and, in many
instances, might be unlikely. See DE VISSER, supra note 119, at 369-72 (describing factors
that might influence frequent use of amendment overrides—including difficulty of formal
amendment rules). But see Holmes & Sunstein, supra note 149, at 253 (“If it is easy to amend
the Constitution, the stakes of constitutional decision are lowered . . . [which] may embolden
the court . . . .”); Ferejohn & Sager, supra note 2, at 1961 (“[T]he Supreme Court . . . does its
work with little fear of correction by constitutional amendment.”).
188 See Denning & Vile, supra note 13, at 276.
189 See id. (citing U.S. CONST. amends XI, XIV, XVI, XXVI as responsive to Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117-19 (1970) (concluding that Congress could not set a uniform
voting age for state elections); Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Tr. Co., 157 U.S. 429, 558-84
(1895) (holding income tax unconstitutional); Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 427 (1851)
(concluding that blacks were not, and could never be, citizens of United States); Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 425 (1793) (concluding that states could be sued in federal
court by citizens of other states, respectively).
190 Dinan, supra note 113, at 1024 (quoting one Progressive Era scholar as saying,
“[I]nasmuch as the constitutions of the states are, comparatively speaking, rather easy of
amendment, it has frequently happened that subsequent to a decision of a state court that an
act of the state legislature is unconstitutional, the state constitution has been so changed as to
remove all objections to the passage of the statute from the point of view of the state
constitution. The natural result is that the limitations of the state constitutions as interpreted
by the state courts are not serious permanent obstacles to social reform, either in the matter of
labor legislation, or, indeed, in any other matter in which change is desired.” (quoting FRANK
J. GOODNOW, SOCIAL REFORMS AND THE CONSTITUTION 30 (1911)); see also Versteeg &
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constraining” amendments cover a broad range of topics, including civil rights,
representation, taxation, and separation of powers issues, among many others.191
Maartje de Visser also identifies various instances across Europe where
countries have amended their constitutions specifically to undo constitutional
rulings by courts (although the practice seems less prevalent in Europe than in
the American states).192 De Visser also identifies a broad range of issues
addressed by amendments overriding court opinions, including federalism
(France and Italy), gender equality (France and Italy), criminal procedure (Italy),
welfare benefits (Germany), voting (Hungary), and taxation (Hungary).193
Additionally, “backlash” amendments are apparently endemic in several Latin
American countries.194
This theory of amendment has significantly influenced the practice of
constitutional design around the world.195 Beginning in the United States in the
early twentieth century, state constitutional designers began to react to state
judges who had used the power of judicial review to frustrate progressive policy
changes by state legislatures.196 One strategy that these reformers deployed was
to relax constitutional amendment rules in order to reign in the power of judicial
review.197 Amendment rules in various state constitutions were redesigned
during the Progressive Era to make amendment easier and to curtail so-called
“activist judges.”198
Mila Versteeg and Emily Zackin have identified similar trends in the design
of amendment rules for national constitutions around the world.199 In a recent
study, they found that in response to the emergence of constitutional courts and
judicial review in Continental Europe, countries relaxed constitutional
amendment rules and passed more amendments in an effort to constrain

Zackin, supra note 10, 664-66 (explaining that change in amendment flexibility in states was
all about accountability to judges).
191 Dinan, supra note 113, at 986-89.
192 See DE VISSER, supra note 119, at 24 (discussing French constitutional amendment
permitting French Parliament to enact legislation promoting equal access for women to
political office); id. at 356-67 (describing in detail examples from France, Germany, Hungary,
and Italy).
193 See id. at 350-68.
194 See Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 10, at 671.
195 See id. at 657-66 (explaining how this version of constitutionalism spread over time
and has become dominant approach).
196 See id. at 666.
197 Id. at 664.
198 See DINAN, supra note 11, at 48.
199 See Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 10, at 666-68.
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courts.200 They found evidence of similar trends in the constitutions of Latin
America.201
Thus, a dominant theme in contemporary constitutional design is the
expectation that flexible and frequent amendment is an effective way to
constrain the power of judicial review. Indeed, scholars have identified this as a
defining feature of a new model of constitutionalism that emphasizes
constitutional flexibility and specificity as a means of controlling agency
costs.202
It is important to note that constitutional design literature often focuses on
amendment as a means of constraining courts by invalidating rulings after the
time of decision and not necessarily by influencing judicial reasoning at the time
of decision. Indeed, some of the design literature suggests that the threat of
amendment should not influence judicial independence at the time of decision
because judges should strive to engage the legislature and the people in a
constructive institutional dialogue, with the judiciary representing an
independent voice in that discussion.203
Implicit in this literature, however, is the suggestion that the use of flexible
amendment procedures is intended to adjust the institutional balance of power
between the courts and the people (or their representatives). In this sense, there
appears to be an expectation that courts will behave differently when applying
an easily amended constitution than when they are applying a rigid constitution.
3.

The Constrained-Agent Theory

As a variation on the principal-agent theory, some scholars have noted that
frequent amendment can constrain judges by limiting their discretion when

200

See id. at 668 (identifying Austrian Constitution of 1920 as example of constitution that
embraces judicial restraint by structuring supreme court as elective body).
201 See id. at 669-71 (detecting exponential growth in average word count of Latin
American constitutions).
202 See id. at 660-61; see also GARDBAUM, supra note 105, at 2.
203 See DE VISSER, supra note 119, at 320-30 (discussing dialogue literature in terms of
amendment overrides). In Commonwealth v. O’Neal, 339 N.E.2d 676, 694 (Mass. 1975),
members of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court sparred over whether, in deciding the
constitutionality of the death penalty, it was appropriate to consider the likelihood of a
responsive constitutional amendment. In rejecting this idea, Justice Tauro wrote:
[T]he fact that the people of California amended their Constitution after the highest court
of that State declared the death penalty unconstitutional does not indicate to me that we
should not reach and decide a properly presented constitutional issue in accordance with
our considered views of the statute and Constitution. It merely indicates the possibility
that an amendment to our Constitution may be the popular response to our decision. If
this eventuates, so be it. The amendment, and not a judicial anticipation of such a
response, is the proper constitutional procedure.
Id. at 692-93.
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applying the constitution.204 This can happen in at least two ways. First, frequent
amendment can result in more specific content being added to a constitution’s
text.205 As a constitution becomes more detailed and specific, courts have fewer
opportunities to develop policy through ambiguous or vague provisions.206 Thus,
rather than exercising judicial review as a necessary consequence of broad openended provisions that invite, and perhaps require, judge-made policy, courts
mechanically enforce the detailed and specific provisions outlined in the
constitution.207 On this theory, one would expect that frequent amendment
would result in a more constrained judiciary—at least in the sense that the courts
would not be developing new substantive constitutional policy on their own.208
Infrequent amendment, on the other hand, presumably corresponds to a less
detailed constitutional text, which requires a more active judiciary to fill in the
blanks.
Frequent amendment can also affect courts’ policymaking authority by
providing courts with information about the people’s preferences for
constitutional change.209 Rosalind Dixon has described this as the
“informational”210 or “evidentiary”211 function of constitutional amendments.
On this theory, even when amendments do not directly constrain the court
regarding a particular issue, they may provide courts with evidence of
“democratic support for constitutional change.”212 This evidence either nudges

204

See, e.g., Dixon, supra note 140, at 108; Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 10, at 660-61.
Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 10, at 660-61.
206 Id. at 660 (“By placing a broad range of detailed policies directly in a constitutional
text, constitution-makers can attempt to constrain the exercise of political power. In other
words, the principal can use a constitutional text to tell its agents exactly what to do and not
do.”); id. at 658 (“Although these flexible constitutions do not entrench commitments over
long time horizons, we argue that they are nonetheless attempts to constrain the exercise of
political power by leaving empowered actors with fewer choices about which policies to
pursue.”). This is not always true. Specific provisions can result in more conflicts between
provisions, which can empower courts to resolve the conflict and amount to a regift of
discretion to courts. See Rosalind Dixon & Tom Ginsburg, The South African Constitutional
Court and Socio-Economic Rights as ‘Insurance Swaps,’ 4 CONST. CT. REV. 1, 1-3 (2011)
(referencing multiple cases in which judges exercised considerable discretion despite specific
constitutional provisions). In this way, specific constitutions might empower courts rather
than constrain them.
207 Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 10, at 660-61.
208 The judiciary may, however, be “active” in the sense of striking down legislation if the
frequent changes in the constitution’s text change legislative power.
209 Dixon, supra note 140, at 107.
210 Dixon, supra note 153, at 647-51.
211 Dixon, supra note 140, at 102.
212 Id. at 99. Dixon has pointed to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Supreme Court’s subsequent incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the states as an
example of the informational, limiting function of amendments. Id. at 98-99. In drafting the
205
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the court in a particular direction that is consistent with democratic preferences,
or it requires the court to incur costs associated with rejecting expressed
democratic preferences.213 In either situation, amendment has an indirect
constraining effect on courts. Consequently, one would expect that frequent
amendments would result in less active and more restrained courts.
C.

A Strategic Account of Amendment Difficulty and Judicial Review

Despite their many insights, the above theories fail to articulate a clear and
consolidated theory of how amendment difficulty might affect judicial review.
These theories have at least three shortcomings that strategic analysis can help
address. In this Section, I recast the theories described above in terms of the
assumptions and logic of strategic analysis and explain the benefits of this
approach.
1.

Clarifying the Theory of Constraint or Empowerment

A shortcoming with existing theories is that they fail to recognize that
amendability can affect judicial review in at least two different ways. First,
amendability might affect a court at the time of decision by altering the
institutional constraints facing judges when they decide constitutional cases.
Deciding a constitutional case in a system where the constitution is amended
very frequently presents judges with a different set of constraints than if they
were deciding the same case under a constitution that is very unlikely to be
amended.214 This, of course, is a claim that overlaps with strategic analysis, and
I will refer to this as the “strategic model.”
However, amendability might also affect judicial review in a more formalistic
and legal way: by providing an after-the-fact process for changing binding rules
set by judicial review. In this scenario, flexible amendment rules can “curb” the
power of judicial review in the sense that they enable adjustments to substantive
constitutional doctrine. In other words, flexible amendment rules affect the
power of judicial review by limiting its substantive scope. Conversely, rigid
amendment procedures empower courts by placing fewer limitations on courts.
This is a much more concrete and formalistic claim of how amendability can

Fourteenth Amendment to explicitly apply due process and equal protection guarantees
against the states, there was evidence of a fundamental shift in power following the Civil War
and a new constitutional order that sought to impose meaningful restraints on state authority.
See id. at 99. This signal from the Fourteenth Amendment set the stage for the incorporation
of other rights protections against the states as consistent with the spirit of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id.
213 Id. at 98-99.
214 See Ferejohn & Sager, supra note 2, at 1961 (making this point regarding Article V and
explaining that “Supreme Court . . . does its work with little fear of correction by
constitutional amendment”).
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affect judicial review. It is concerned with only the array of substantive choices
that remain available to courts. I will call this the “substantive model.”215
For example, in 2008, the California Supreme Court held that the state’s
marriage statute, which limited marriage to heterosexual couples, violated the
state constitution’s due process, equality, and liberty guarantees.216 Soon
thereafter, Californians amended their constitution to provide that “[o]nly
marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California”
(Proposition 8).217 In 2009, in an opinion upholding the amendment and
California’s marriage statute, the California Supreme Court held that as a matter
of law the amendment was a specific and permissible carve out from the
constitution’s more general equal-protection guarantee, and that the court was
unable to hold that equal protection required marriage equality.218 Proposition 8
is instructive for present purposes because it illustrates how amendments can
“limit” judicial review by establishing substantive constitutional policy without
necessarily influencing a court’s reasoning at the time of decision.
The problem with existing theories is that they seem to draw on both the
strategic and substantive models without being precise or consistent. Proponents
of the hydraulic theory, for example, claim that rigid constitutions expand
judicial review because pressures for constitutional change reroute reform
through the courts. But what do they mean by this? Do they mean simply that
under rigid constitutions more substantive reform occurs through the judiciary
than through formal amendment? This would seem to be a rather uninteresting
and obvious claim at this point in constitutional theory (especially for purposes
of contemporary constitutional design). Rather, it seems that many proponents
of the hydraulics theory also claim, to some degree, that rigid constitutions
empower courts to be more active in bringing about constitutional change
because judicial review is the only (or primary) avenue for constitutional
reform.219

215

By this I do not mean to distinguish between constitutional procedure and substance. I
mean to distinguish between how judges assess the constraints on deciding a constitutional
case and the actual outcome of constitutional cases. Also, I do not mean to suggest that these
two models are mutually exclusive. In fact, they are likely inseparable. For purposes of
conceptual clarity (and empirical testing), however, it is important to draw attention to these
distinctions.
216 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 440 (Cal. 2008). See generally Frederick Mark
Gedicks, Truth and Consequences: Mitt Romney, Proposition 8, and Public Reason, 61 ALA.
L. REV. 337 (2010).
217 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5; see also Jonathan L. Marshfield, Models of Subnational
Constitutionalism, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 1151, 1197 (2011) (describing Proposition 8
enactment and litigation).
218 Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 122 (Cal. 2009).
219 A related possibility is that pressure for constitutional change legitimates the court’s
activist rulings.
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Proponents of the principal-agent and constrained-agent theories make
similarly ambiguous claims. Do flexible amendment procedures reduce agency
costs simply because frequent corrective amendments ensure that the overall
substance of constitutional law more closely aligns with popular preferences?
Or do flexible amendment procedures reduce agency costs because they promote
more faithful actions by judges at the time of decision? Again, the first claim
would seem to be rather obvious and uninteresting from the standpoint of
contemporary constitutional design. Rather, proponents of these agency theories
seem to claim, at least to some degree, that flexible amendment procedures
reduce agency costs by affecting how courts behave at the times of decision.220
Once we recognize that current theories are aimed at strategic theories that
explain how courts are affected by amendability at the time of decision, it is
possible to articulate a consolidated strategic account of how amendability might
influence the practice of judicial review. If we adopt the assumptions of strategic
analysis (that judges seek to decide cases in ways that are most aligned with their
ideological preferences and followed by other political actors), we might
summarize existing theories as making at least the following claims:
 When constitutions are old and are amended infrequently, courts have an
incentive to prefer progressive applications of the constitution in order to
preserve the stability and legitimacy of the existing constitution, which is
necessary for the preservation of their own rulings and ideological
preferences. This incentive is lessened when constitutions are young or
amended frequently (Hydraulics Theory).
 When constitutions are amended infrequently, judges have less reason to
be concerned about a direct override of their rulings even if their own
preferences are out of step with legislative or popular preferences. Under
these conditions, they may have an incentive to use judicial review to
entrench their own ideological preferences (Principal-Agent Theory).
 When constitutions are amended frequently, judges may be influenced by
the fear of override, although this may further depend on whether they
understand their own ideological preferences to be in conflict with the
preferences of override actors, such as legislators and voters. Under these
conditions, they may have an incentive to use judicial review in ways that
avoid direct conflict with the preferences of override actors (PrincipalAgent Theory).
 When constitutions are amended frequently, courts have access to
principled information regarding the community’s preferences for
constitutional change, which can constrain courts by increasing the
saliency of acting against those preferences (Constrained-Agent Theory).

220 It should be noted that some scholars who have written about these agency theories
have taken a rather ambivalent approach to whether or not flexible amendment is actually
effective in restraining judges. Instead, they point out the constitutional designers increasingly
believe that flexible amendment has restraining effects. They are, in other words, descriptive
accounts of how constitutional designers are behaving.
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Articulating these claims in terms of strategic analysis provides greater clarity
for the claims of existing theories. It also sets the stage for more reliable
empirical investigation into whether (and under what conditions) amendability
affects the practice of judicial review.
2.

The Need to Identify Other Meaningful Constraints

Recasting existing theories as a strand of strategic analysis brings its own
difficulties. For one thing, it draws attention to the many other institutional
constraints that might influence the practice of judicial review besides formal
amendment. Existing constitutional design theories tend to have a myopic focus
on amendment as the only meaningful influence on the practice of judicial
review. There are, however, many institutional factors that might affect how
courts apply a constitution. If judges are elected, for example, they might have
more immediate backlash concerns besides reprisal amendments. Similarly, the
sophistication and relative strength of override actors might influence judges. A
nonprofessional legislature, for instance, might not be as adept at skirting court
rulings, and a weak executive might not be as threatening to a court.
Additionally, even under rigid constitutions, informal constitutional change
might also occur through other institutions besides the judiciary, which can
influence a judge’s strategy when deciding constitutional cases. John Ferejohn
and William Eskridge have argued, for example, that the U.S. Constitution is
informally amended by congressional “super-statutes” that Americans endow
with quasi-constitutional status.221 Richard Albert has also observed a similar
phenomenon in Canada, where the constitution is also exceptionally hard to
amend.222 If pressures for constitutional change are addressed through superstatutes, then pressure on the judiciary to take responsibility for necessary
constitutional change may not be as overwhelming as Lutz and others have
suggested.
There are many institutional constraints that we can imagine impacting how
a judge decides a constitutional case. It is not my purpose to identify all of them
here,223 but theories regarding the effect of amendability on judicial review must
come to terms with the reality of alternative influences.224 Empirical studies
must also make efforts to account for these alternative effects. And constitutional
design literature must place the relationship between amendability and judicial

221

William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 123031 (2001) (arguing that law can attain super-statute status if it substantially alters regulatory
baselines, “sticks” in public psyche, and is product of extensive and meaningful deliberation).
222 See generally Richard Albert, Quasi-Constitutional Amendments, 65 BUFF. L. REV. 739
(2017).
223 For a slightly more in-depth look at the many forces that can influence whether
constitutional change occurs through formal or informal processes, see generally Jonathan L.
Marshfield, Respecting the Mystery of Constitutional Change, BUFF. L. REV. (forthcoming).
224 See Ferejohn, supra note 5, at 523-24 (making this point in analyzing Lutz’s 1994
article).
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review in full context rather than describe it in monolithic terms that potentially
mislead constitution makers and reformers.
3.

Measuring Judicial Activism or Restraint

A strategic account of amendability and judicial review also brings another
issue to the forefront that existing theories have obscured. Under a strategic
model, measuring the influence of amendability necessarily requires a way to
measure judicial restraint or activism. A “substantive model” can demonstrate
the effect of amendment on judicial review by assessing how much substantive
constitutional doctrine comes from details in a constitution’s text, and how much
comes from judicial interpretations of the constitution’s text. Systems with a
high proportion of judge-made constitutional law presumably reflect minimal
influence of formal amendment. Conversely, systems with a high proportion of
constitutional doctrine coming from detailed constitutional amendments reflect
the influence of formal amendment.
Strategic models require a more nuanced approach. They must identify some
measure of judicial activism in order to assess whether amendment frequency
has any effect on that measure. As noted above, however, leading constitutional
design scholarship generally sidesteps this issue and accounts for only the
existence (without the practice) of judicial review in its various forms.225 I am
unaware of any comparative study that includes rigorous analysis of how courts
actually practice judicial review when operating under constitutions of varying
flexibility.
Here, strategic analysis research again provides insight. In an important work
titled Measuring Judicial Activism, Stephanie Lindquist and Frank Cross
identify various dimensions of judicial activism that are amenable to
quantification.226 Specifically, they argue that analyzing the frequency with
which judges find statutes or executive actions unconstitutional is a reliable
measure of at least one dimension of judicial activism.227 They also argue that
the frequency with which judges overturn their own precedent is an especially
reliable indicator of judicial activism.228 They explain that the decision to

225 As I mention above, Lijphart is an exception to this, but his measure of judicial activism
is unclear and seems anecdotal. See Lijphart, supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
226 LINDQUIST & CROSS, supra note 21, at 43. Lindquist and Cross build on a large body of
research from strategic scholars that analyze the practice of judicial review by federal courts
(mostly the Supreme Court). This scholarship is incredibly helpful and important. See
generally Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEXAS L. REV. 257 (2005)
(summarizing much of this literature). However, because of its focus on federal courts, it has
not explored how variations in amendment frequency might be relevant to the practice of
judicial review. Id. at 313 (discussing various checking effects on Supreme Court’s use of
judicial review but admitting that amendment is not one of them).
227 LINDQUIST & CROSS, supra note 21, at 43-44.
228 See id.
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overrule precedent requires a court to “lay[] bare the choice to create new law in
the face of existing, binding legal rules.”229 Consequently, it is the “most visible
and dramatic instance of interpretative instability.”230As explained below, I rely
on Lindquist and Cross’s methodology in constructing my measure of judicial
activism, especially their conclusion that the frequency of overruling precedent
is a meaningful measure of judicial activism and restraint.231
III. TESTING THE EFFECT OF AMENDMENT ON JUDICIAL REVIEW
Existing theories suggest an inverse relationship between amendment
frequency and judicial review: as amendment frequency increases, judges are
more restrained, and as amendment frequency decreases, judges are more active.
In this Section, I test this hypothesis and find that it is oversimplified and
partially incorrect.
To test whether amendment frequency is a reliable predictor of judicial
activism, I use a regression model designed by scholars of strategic analysis to
identify variables that accurately predict when a court will overrule its own
precedent.232 I apply the model to my own original dataset of approximately
5445 hand-coded state supreme court opinions. Because state constitutional
amendment rates vary widely, this dataset provides an important opportunity to
analyze how judges practice judicial review when deciding cases under
constitutions of varying degrees of flexibility.
My findings suggest that the prevailing hypothesis is partially incorrect
because although there is a statistically significant relationship between
amendment frequency and judicial activism, I find evidence that the relationship
is curvilinear, with the highest rates of amendment predicting high rates of

229

Id. at 36.
Id. (citing Bradley C. Canon, Defining the Dimensions of Judicial Activism,
66 JUDICATURE 237, 241 (1983)).
231 Lindquist and Cross note that courts can undermine precedent gradually by eroding its
“application to future cases,” but those instances are “much harder to identify . . . than
outright votes to overturn a precedent, and thus pose a more difficult (and sometimes perhaps
insurmountable) empirical task.” Id. at 36.
232 I use essentially the identical model that Lindquist has used to measure judicial activism
in state courts. Lindquist, supra note 33, at 183 (using court size, selection method, and tenure
length as variables); see also Stephanie Lindquist, Judicial Activism in State Supreme Courts:
Institutional Design and Judicial Behavior, 28 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 61, 65 (2017).
However, Lindquist’s models do not use annual amendment-rate data as an independent
control variable and her data do not contain information about whether the court overruled a
constitutional or nonconstitutional case. In other words, although her models are well
structured for identifying institutional constraints affecting judicial activism in state courts
(indeed, I adopt them wholesale here), she did not test for the “amendment effect” because
her data did not allow her to do so. My data, therefore, provide the first opportunity to test for
the amendment effect.
230
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judicial activism. In other words, the data suggest that there may be a “tipping
point” where amendment is so frequent that it loses its constraining effect on
judges and may actually facilitate activism. Further, to the extent that my data
suggest a linear relationship at all, they indicate a positive linear relationship
where judicial activism increases as formal amendment frequency increases.
Thus, the relationship between amendment frequency and judicial review seems
counterintuitive and more complicated than the simple inverse linear
relationship that prevailing theories suggest.233
A.

Empirical Methodology and Data Collection

I focus my inquiry on state constitutions and state supreme court opinions
interpreting those constitutions. This sample has at least five advantages. First,
there is a large amount of data regarding state constitutions, courts, and politics,
which makes rigorous comparative analysis possible. Second, state constitutions
exhibit a variety of different formal amendment procedures and a wide but
balanced range of amendment rates.234 Indeed, state constitutions include most
of the amendment procedures found in national constitutions around the world,
and state amendment rates nicely mirror trends in national constitutional
amendment rates worldwide.235 Thus, at least on the issue of amendability, state
constitutions provide a window into worldwide constitutional trends. Third, as
noted earlier, state constitution-makers purposefully relaxed amendment rules
in many states specifically to control judges, which makes them fitting
candidates for this study.236 Fourth, all states have adopted strong-form judicial
review with the same basic parameters.237 The only minor nuance in this regard
is that Nebraska and North Dakota both require a supermajority of justices (all
but one) to declare a statute unconstitutional.238 Finally, state court opinions

233

Indeed, my findings also show that several other variables besides amendment
frequency reliably predict when a court is likely to overturn a constitutional precedent. These
include whether judges are elected or appointed, the court’s ideological configuration, the
ideological gap between the court and the citizenry, and the number of judges on the court. In
sum, my data suggest that amendment frequency is a reliably predictor of overruling behavior,
but that this relationship is complicated and likely impacted by a variety of other factors as
well.
234 For an overview, see DINAN, supra note 22, at 11-12 (showing amendment procedures
and number of amendments for all extant constitutions).
235 Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 14, at 1688 (placing state amendment rates side by side
with foreign constitutional amendment rates and finding strong correspondence).
236 Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 10, at 666.
237 On the evolution of judicial review in state high courts, see LAURA LANGER, JUDICIAL
REVIEW IN STATE SUPREME COURTS 1-11 (2002); G. ALAN TARR, WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR:
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE STATES 62-63 (2012)
(summarizing state practices for invalidating legislation and recalling judicial decisions).
238 TARR, supra note 237, at 63.
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provide an accessible source of information regarding judicial behavior.
Opinions by foreign courts can present language, cultural, and expertise barriers
that can frustrate reliable comparative analysis.
That said, state constitutions are not a perfect sample. They operate under
different constraints than national constitutions, and they contain many
eccentricities that can make comparative analysis difficult.239 Some of these
limitations may be relevant to the practice of judicial review.
Tom Ginsburg and Richard Posner have argued that subnational constitutions
are fundamentally different than national constitutions because: (1) national
constitutions must place limits on theoretically unlimited government power, but
subnational constitutions already operate within a legally defined space, (2)
there is usually no effective enforcement mechanism operating above a national
constitution, but national governments can provide effective monitoring and
enforcement mechanisms regarding subnational abuses, and (3) subnational
units more readily risk losing citizens to neighboring units.240
Ginsburg and Posner infer from these differences that there is an inevitable
disparity in constitutional stability between national and subnational
constitutions.241 In their view, high agency costs mean that national
constitutional constraints must be relatively strong, static, and difficult to
change.242 Subnational constitutions, however, can be relatively more fluid
because agency costs are lower and any errant experiments will be corrected by
national institutions.243 I have argued elsewhere that this can be a virtue in
federal systems with layered constitutional structures because subnational
constitutions provide a safe place for constitutional development and
experimentation.244
These considerations might affect how state courts interpret and apply their
constitutions. State judges may recognize that their state constitutions operate
under the bulwark protections and grounding stability of the Federal
Constitution. This could influence their practice of judicial review in ways that
are different from how the Supreme Court approaches the Federal Constitution.
One could imagine, therefore, different patterns in how judges approach judicial
review when interpreting state rather than national constitutions.245

239

See Tom Ginsburg & Eric A. Posner, Subconstitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1583,
1601-02 (2010).
240 Id. at 1596-97.
241 Id. at 1593-94.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Marshfield, supra note 217, at 1183-86 (explaining that flexible subnational
constitutions and lower agency costs encourage deliberation).
245 I am grateful to Richard Albert for emphasizing the importance of this consideration.
It is truly a significant line of inquiry that deserves more focused attention. In future research,
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Despite these important countervailing considerations, scholars of
comparative constitutional law have increasingly drawn on state constitutions to
test general principles of constitutional design and performance.246 Future
research will hopefully provide more representative data from national
constitutional systems around the world, but state constitutions are, at the very
least, a good starting point for empirical inquiry. Nevertheless, I rely on them
with the understanding and disclaimer that they contain these (and perhaps
other) limitations.
Regarding a measure of amendment flexibility, I use the annual amendment
rate for each state constitution, which is simply the number of amendments
divided by the constitution’s age in years.247 As noted above, amendment rates
are generally the preferred measure of constitutional flexibility because they
account for the structure of formal amendment rules as well as any cultural
influences that might impact amendment frequency.248

I hope to investigate whether these factors have any systematic effect on the practice of
judicial review by state judges.
246 E.g., Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 10, at 666; Dixon, supra note 224, at 200; see also,
e.g., Nicholas Stephanopoulos & Mila Versteeg, The Contours of Constitutional Approval,
94 WASH. U. L. REV. 113, 178 (2016).
247 My data include an amendment rate for each year in the sample. I lagged the
amendment rate so that it would correspond to the known amendment rate at the time of a
court’s decision. I gathered all of this information from the various editions of the COUNCIL
OF STATE GOVERNMENT, BOOK OF THE STATES from 1960 to 2004. There were a handful of
years for a handful of states where data were missing. For those years, I extrapolated
amendment rates from the years known before and after the missing data.
248 See supra Section II.A.3 (summarizing literature on this point). Several scholars have
used amendment years (the number of years when one or more amendments were adopted) to
calculate amendment rates rather than the actual number of ratified amendments. See supra
note 145 and accompanying text. This is based on the concern that some amendments are
adopted in bundles (like the Bill of Rights) and should properly be counted together as a single
political act. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. I doubt whether this is an especially
common occurrence in state constitutional law for several reasons. First, the vast majority of
states impose single-subject requirements on amendment proposals. See A.E. v. State, 949
N.E.2d 1204, 1221 & n.1 (Ind. 2011) (Dickson, J., concurring) (listing forty-one state
constitutions that contain single-subject rule for legislation); Single Subject Rules, NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (May 8, 2009), http://www.ncsl.org/research/electionsand-campaigns/single-subject-rules.aspx [https://perma.cc/YA8Y-YALX] (listing fifteen
state constitutions that contain single-subject rule for ballot initiatives). Second, some states
place a cap on the number of amendments that the legislature can propose in one election. See
DINAN, supra note 22, at T1.2. Third, some states have strict rules requiring that amendments
be clearly described to voters in a caption or synopsis. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 101.161(3)
(2017) (stating that each proposed amendment must include ballot statement of seventy-five
words or fewer). Finally, states have a tradition of considering and adopting amendments on
a great variety of issues at one time and voters often approve some and reject others. Thus, it
seems speculative to assume that systematic bundling of amendments occurs such that
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Regarding a measure of judicial activism, I adopt Lindquist and Cross’s
conclusion that the frequency with which courts overrule their own precedent is
a reliable indicator of at least one dimension of judicial activism.249 Explicitly
overruling constitutional precedent is an especially reliable indicator of judicial
activism or restraint because it represents discrete, countable instances where a
court intentionally breaks from the constitutional status quo and brings about
constitutional change.250 Overruling behavior may be an underinclusive measure
of instances where courts have changed constitutional rules. Courts can depart
from existing constitutional doctrine without explicitly overruling prior
precedent by, for example, recognizing new constitutional rights that courts have
not previously been rejected.251 Nevertheless, due to the difficulty in
systematically and reliably identifying such rulings,252 I rely on overruling
frequency as a measure of judicial activism with the understanding that this
measure has inherent limitations.253
To identify how frequently state supreme courts overturn constitutional
precedent, I created an original dataset that captures every instance between
1970 and 2004 where a state supreme court overruled one of its own
constitutional precedents.254 To gather this data, I first retrieved from Westlaw
all citations for all published cases by all state supreme courts from their

amendments should not be individually counted. In fact, lumping amendments together for
counting purposes would seem to create more errors. At least for purposes of this study, I rely
on actual amendment rates as reported by the states themselves to the Council of State
Governments.
249 LINDQUIST & CROSS, supra note 21, at 43 (counting votes of justices and searching for
trends in various contexts).
250 It should be noted that my data eliminate all instances where a court overruled a prior
constitutional precedent because of intervening amendments or federal rulings that rendered
the precedent invalid. In this sense, it captured instances where the courts truly made
independent choices to change constitutional doctrine.
251 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 402 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(explaining that significant changes in constitutional doctrine can occur without explicit
overruling).
252 LINDQUIST & CROSS, supra note 21, at 43.
253 It should also be noted that Lindquist and Cross measured overruling behavior at the
level of votes by individual Justices on the Supreme Court. Id. at 130-31. This obviously
provides a more precise measure of judicial decision-making from a strategic account. See
Lindquist, supra note 232, at 186-87 (noting that this is generally preferred approach).
However, in subsequent work regarding state court activism, Lindqust has relied on rulings
by court majorities rather than judge-level data. Id. Because of limitations on available judgelevel data for state judges, I also rely on rulings by court majorities.
254 As explained below, this date range was determined by the availability of data for
certain important control variables.
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inception until the end of 2004.255 This captured citation information for more
than two million cases. After collecting the citation information, I retrieved
Westlaw KeyCite flags for all those cases.256 I then identified all cases with a
red KeyCite flag, which indicates that the case is no longer valid for at least one
point of law. There were 42,730 cases from all state high courts with red KeyCite
flags. I then retrieved full KeyCite reports for all those cases. Along with a team
of six law students, I reviewed the KeyCite reports for all cases that Westlaw
had red flagged because they were overturned by another state supreme court
opinion.257 We excluded all cases that were red flagged because they were
overruled or superseded by a federal court, a federal statute, a state statute, or a
state constitutional amendment.258 Because of limitations on available data for
other relevant control variables, I further limited the KeyCite review to
identifying opinions decided between 1970 and 2004.
This resulted in a dataset of 5445 cases from all state high courts that Westlaw
flagged as overruling prior precedent from the same court. I then personally
reviewed all of those opinions and coded them based on whether they involved
the overruling of a state constitutional precedent.259 The final dataset includes
all cases from all state high courts between 1970 and 2004 that overruled
precedent from the same state supreme court. As part of my coding, I eliminated
cases that overturn prior precedent because of intervening rulings by the U.S.
Supreme Court that effectively invalidated older state precedent. I also

255

My methodology here is inspired by Lindquist’s methods in Stare Decisis as a
Reciprocity Norm. See Lindquist, Stare Decisis, supra note 232, at 178-79, 189. However,
her work did not code cases by category and did not hand-code the KeyCite reports.
256 The use of KeyCite information for this sort of research is rather common practice. See,
e.g., Lindquist, supra note 33, at 189; Westerland, et al., supra note 85, at 896 (using LEXIS
Shepard’s citator for empirical study).
257 We excluded cases overruled by federal courts, federal statutes, state legislation, or
state constitutional amendments. All reviewers followed a strict protocol and coding was
subjected to blind spot checking. The review protocol is on file with the author and available
upon request.
258 Because I applied this methodology to the KeyCite reports for every case decided by
each state high court from its beginning until the end of 2004, I was able to capture all
overruling events during my timeframe even if the overruling case was later invalidated by
federal court rulings, statutes, or constitutional amendments. However, if a state high court
case was invalidated only because of a federal court ruling, statute, or constitutional
amendment, I did not include it in my count of overruling events.
259 This coding was relatively complex. For consistency, I developed and applied a coding
protocol, which is available upon request. The guiding principle in this coding was to identify
all instances where a court overturned an existing constitutional rule set by a prior opinion
from the same court. Thus, I did not include cases where the court recognized that one of its
prior precedents was trumped by a federal law or court ruling or an intervening state
constitutional amendment or statutory change. Consequently, my database captures all
instances where a state court brought about a change in constitutional doctrine on its own
accord.
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eliminated cases that overruled prior precedent based on intervening state
constitutional amendments or legislative enactments that necessitated the
overruling. These cuts result in a reliable dataset of state supreme court opinions
that overturned prior constitutional precedent for reasons unrelated to actions by
other political actors, which enhances the data’s reliability as indicative of
judicial activism.
Of the 5445 cases, 643 involved the overruling of a constitutional precedent
on these terms. Figure 1 below shows the average number of constitutional cases
overturned per year and the average number of nonconstitutional cases
overturned per year for each state, organized by region. The average rate of
overruling constitutional cases is 0.35 cases per year (or 1 overruling every 2.8
years). The median is 0.3 (or 1 overruling every 3.3 years). California has the
highest annual rate of overruling constitutional precedents at 1.17 precedents per
year. Vermont has the lowest rate at 0.03 (or 1 overruling every 35 years).
Oklahoma (civil), South Carolina, and Utah are closest to the average overruling
rate, and Mississippi is the median.
Figure 1. Average Annual Frequency of Overruling Constitutional and Non-Constitutional
Precedent per Year, 1970-2004
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Southern States
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Finally, as explained in more detail below, my regression model accounts for
various institutional factors other than amendment frequency. Those factors
include, but are not limited to, judicial selection and retention procedures, the
number of judges on the court, the ideological balance of the court, the length of
experience of the judges, ideological gaps between the court and citizens,
ideological gaps between the court and political elites, the constitution’s age and
length, and other demographic information. Most of the data for these variables
comes from the State Politics and the Judiciary Codebook,260 but I provide more
details regarding each of these variables and their data sources below.
Unfortunately, data for some of these important variables were not available for
all times, which is why my study was limited to the period 1970-2004.
B.

Empirical Findings

Before discussing the results of my regression analysis, I describe various
important observations from the aggregate data. Specifically, the data show that
several states defy the prevailing hypothesis because they appear to exist in a
state of extreme constitutional volatility on account of high formal amendment
rates and high rates of judicial activism. Conversely, various states appear to
exist in a remarkable state of constitutional stagnation with very old

260

STEPHANIE A. LINDQUIST, STATE POLITICS AND THE JUDICIARY CODEBOOK (2007). The
Codebook is a comprehensive database including longitudinal data about state government,
politics, and courts regarding a variety of issues over a large span of years.
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constitutions that are amended infrequently and where courts are very inactive.
There are, of course, states that fit the prevailing hypothesis, but my findings
challenge prevailing assumptions about the interaction between formal
amendment and judicial review.
1.

Aggregate Findings

Several interesting observations emerge when comparing the average
overruling rates described above to each state’s average annual amendment
rate.261 Figure 2 below illustrates each state’s amendment rate across its annual
rate of overruling constitutional precedent. For purposes of this analysis, I
exclude seven states that adopted new constitutions during the period of my
study because the young age of those constitutions and the few years available
for change make them unfair comparisons to other states with more established
constitutions.262 For both Oklahoma and Texas, I combine totals from the Court
of Criminal Appeals and the Supreme Court to calculate aggregate amounts for
those states.
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Figure 2. Average Annual Frequency of Overruling Constitutional Precedent Compared
to Average Formal Amendment Rate, 1970-2004

0

261

1

2
Avg. Annual Amendment Rate

3

4

Appendix A shows the average annual amendment rate for each state constitution
through 2004 as well as the average number of constitutional and nonconstitutional precedents
overturned per year for each state between 1970 and 2004.
262 Those states are Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, North Carolina, Rhode Island,
and Virginia.
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The data show that some states fit the prevailing hypothesis. Hawaii, for
example has a very high amendment rate (third highest) and a very low
overruling rate (sixth lowest). Maryland also has a relatively high amendment
rate (eighth highest), and a low overruling rate (fourth lowest). Conversely, West
Virginia has a relatively low amendment rate (seventh lowest) and a relatively
high overruling rate (fifth highest).
However, the most striking revelation from these data is that many states
experience amendment frequency and judicial activism in quantities that
challenge the prevailing hypothesis. Several states with high amendment rates
also have high rates of overturning constitutional precedent. California stands
out in this regard because it has the highest amendment rate of any state and the
second highest overruling rate for constitutional precedent. Alabama,
Oklahoma, and Texas are similar. Texas has the fourth highest amendment rate
and the highest overruling rate. Similarly, Alabama has the eighth highest
amendment rate and the third highest overruling rate, and Oklahoma has the
eleventh highest amendment rate and the fourth highest overruling rate. These
states defy the conventional expectation that high amendment rates should
correspond to low rates of judicial activism. Remarkably, these states appear to
exist in a state of multidimensional volatility with frequent amendments to the
constitutional text and frequent changes to constitutional doctrine by the courts.
It is also significant that several states seem to exist in a condition of
constitutional stagnation without much change occurring through the courts or
through amendment. Vermont is striking in this regard. It has the third lowest
amendment rate, the lowest overruling rate, and one of the oldest constitutions
(ratified in 1793).263 Indiana is similar. It has the fourth lowest amendment rate,
the sixth lowest overruling rate, and a very old constitution (ratified in 1851).264
Iowa and Wyoming also fit this category. These constitutionally stagnant states
also defy prevailing hypotheses.
Finally, the overall correlation between the states’ amendment rates and
overruling rates contradicts the prevailing hypothesis. Rather than showing a
negative correlation (i.e., an inverse relationship), there is actually a statistically
significant (p=0.0002) slightly positive correlation (coefficient=0.5384).265
Figure 3 illustrates the correlation with a fitted regression line showing ninety
percent confidence intervals.

263

See Dinan, supra note 22, at 11-12 tbl.1.1 (listing year of adoption for all state
constitutions).
264 See id.
265 For a similar analysis of judicial involvement in constitutional change and frequency
of formal amendment, see LIJPHART, supra note 1, at 229 fig. 12.1.
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Figure 3. Correlation Between Amendment Rate and Overruling Rate, 1970-2004
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This correlation suggests that, on aggregate, judicial overruling behavior
actually increases as amendment frequency increases. This is a surprising and
counterintuitive result in view of the prevailing hypothesis, which would suggest
the exact opposite relationship. To be sure, the fitted line is a relatively poor
representation of the data as a whole (r-squared=0.2899), but the data seem to
provide almost no support for the prevailing hypothesis. Even when California,
Indiana, Texas, and Vermont are omitted as potential outliers, the correlation
remains slightly positive (coefficient=0.1030) but is now statistically
insignificant (p=0.5328). The fitted regression line for this truncated data also
shows a slightly positive coefficient (0.0401), but the line is even less
representative (r-squared=0.0106). Thus, at the very least, my data provide no
reliable support for the prevailing hypothesis and some evidence that there can
be a positive linear relationship between amendment frequency and judicial
activism.
Although these aggregate data are informative, they do not take full advantage
of all the information and variation in the database. Most importantly, they fail
to account for any alternative predictors of judicial activism besides amendment
rates. Thus, I now turn to the panel data count regression to calculate more
reliable estimates.
2.

Regression Analysis and Findings

Political scientists and legal scholars have developed quantitative models to
test whether institutional variables are related to a state court’s “propensity to
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overrule precedent.”266 These models analyze year-to-year panel count data by
regressing the number of times an event occurs in a year (the count dependent
variable) on a variety of potentially related measures (independent and control
variables).267 This structure lends itself to the use of a Poisson regression.268
However, because count data often present the problem of overdispersion,269 it
is necessary to use a negative binomial regression to account for the
overdispersion.270
Lindquist has applied this approach to identify variables that accurately
predict a state supreme court’s propensity to overrule its own precedent.271
Lindquist did not distinguish between overruling constitutional precedent and
nonconstitutional precedent and she did not include annual amendment-rate
data.272 Nevertheless, I adopt the basic structure of her regression model here to
analyze whether amendment frequency reliably predicts a court’s propensity to
overturn its own constitutional precedent.
The dependent variable in my regression is a positive integer count variable
that captures the number of times each year that a court overruled one of its own
constitutional precedents from 1970 to 2004. As explained above, these data are
the result of my own review and coding of state supreme court opinions. Because
of the likelihood of overdispersion in the count data, I used a negative binomial
regression.

266 E.g., Lindquist, supra note 33, at 179. Similar models have been used to test a state’s
propensity to amend its constitution. Dixon, supra note 33, at 201.
267 E.g., Lindquist, supra note 33, at 179.
268 See Dixon, supra note 33, at 202 (explaining how ordinary least squared regression is
not suitable approach to count data, which can indicate only positive integer outcomes).
269 Overdispersion occurs where the conditional variance is larger than the conditional
mean for a variable of interest. Id. at 202 n.7. In this case, the dependent count variable
displays overdispersion.
270 J. SCOTT LONG & JEREMY FREESE, REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL VARIABLES
USING STATA 507 (3d ed. 2014). This approach does not necessarily solve all difficulties in
modeling a court’s propensity to overturn constitutional precedent. For example, the negative
binomial assumes that each observation is independent and not affected by earlier
observations. This may be a poor assumption for these data because one could imagine that
political actors considering amendment and overrulings are affected by the number of similar
events in the prior year.
271 E.g., Lindquist, supra note 33, at 179 (identifying tenure length, selection method, and
court size).
272 Lindquist’s data included a loose measure of amendment frequency. She relied on
amendment rates from Lutz’s 1994 article. Id. at 183. However, these rates do not change
over time. Id.; see Lutz, supra note 5, at 362. This represents a rather significant limitation on
the data to test for the influence of amendment frequency over time. As described above, my
data include a lagged measure of each constitution’s average annual amendment rate based
on the number of amendments actually made to each constitution from year to year.
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I regressed the count variable over the following sixteen independent
variables with fixed and random effects for the states: (1) constitutional
amendment rate; (2) constitutional amendment rate squared; (3) the number of
justices on the court; (4) the number of clerks assigned to the justices; (5) the
average tenure length of the particular justices on the court at the time of
decision; (6) whether justices are elected in partisan elections; (7) a dummy
variable capturing whether justices are subject to retention elections or recurring
partisan elections, whether they are subject to retention via nonpartisan
elections, or whether they are subject to retention by gubernatorial or legislative
re-appointment; (8) whether the state has an intermediate appellate court; (9) the
absolute value of any ideological change on the court the year before the
decision; (10) a measure of legislative professionalism; (11) the constitution’s
length in words; (12) the constitution’s age in years; (13) the state’s population;
(14) the state’s level of urbanization; (15) the absolute difference in ideology
between the median justice on the court and the median citizen; and (16) the
absolute difference in ideology between the median justice on the court and state
government officials.
As described above, the amendment rate variable is based on the total number
of amendments divided by the age of the constitution during each year.273 I also
included the square of this variable to test for a nonlinear relationship with the
count data. I included the number of justices on the court as a control variable
because other scholars have shown that the size of a court is a reliable
institutional predictor of a court’s propensity to overrule precedent.274 Similarly,
I included the number of clerks assigned to justices as a control variable because
scholars have suggested that the professionalism of the judiciary might affect
overruling behavior because professional courts could have an increased
sensitivity to protecting judicial legitimacy.275 As others have done, I used the
number of clerks as a proxy for measuring judicial professionalism.276 I also

273

I compiled this data from various publications of the BOOK OF THE STATES, which report
reliable and consistent amendment counts for every state from year to year. There were a few
years for which data were missing for a few states. For those years, I estimated the amendment
rate based on available data from before and after the missing years. Because I am testing
whether amendment frequency impacts judicial decision-making, the amendment rates are
offset by a year. For example, the amendment rate appearing in the observations for 1970
represents the number of amendments to a constitution through the end of 1969 divided by
the constitution’s age through the end of 1969. This ensures that the amendment rate in my
data is consistent with the amendment rate that would be known to judges deciding cases in
1970. Descriptive statistics for these data are in Appendix B.
274 Lindquist, supra note 33, at 183-84. These data are from the JUDICIAL CODEBOOK,
supra note 260 (“size” variable no. 128).
275 E.g., Lindquist, supra note 33, at 182.
276 See id. at 182 (noting that number of clerks can “cut both ways” if young lawyers
pressure judges to innovate or provide them with “necessary leisure time to craft opinions that
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included the average tenure of the justices on the court because others have
found that tenure length can be associated with overruling behavior.277
Because judicial elections could be associated with how judges respect
precedent and how they practice judicial review, I include a dummy variable that
indicates whether judges are elected via partisan elections.278 I also included a
dummy variable for judicial retention methods. Some states subject sitting
judges to retention elections or partisan elections for reappointment. Other states
utilize nonpartisan elections for retention, and some states authorize the
governor or legislature to pass on judicial reappointments. These retention
procedures may provide judges with varying degrees of security and
independence, which can affect how judges approach precedent. I included a
dummy variable for retention processes to account for this.279
As explained earlier, courts sometimes control their dockets strategically
based on how they hope to decide cases on the merits. The strategic use of
discretionary review might affect the frequency of overruling behavior as courts
use the power of certiorari “to identify cases as vehicles for legal change.”280 To
account for this, I also include a dummy variable indicating whether a state has
an intermediate appellate court, which operates as a proxy for a discretionary
docket.281
A court’s docket size might independently affect overruling behavior and the
practice of judicial review because fewer cases will presumably provide fewer
opportunities to overrule precedent.282 Unfortunately, reliable and consistent
information about state court dockets is hard to collect.283 However, in states
where docket data are available, Lindquist has found a strong correlation
between state population size and docket size.284 Thus, as she has done, I use
population size and urbanization (to account for any demographic effects) as

change the legal status quo”). These data are from the JUDICIAL CODEBOOK, supra note 260
(“clerk_assoc” variable no. 60).
277 E.g., Lindquist, supra note 33, at 182. I also include the standard deviation of average
tenure for the same reason. These data are from the JUDICIAL CODEBOOK, supra note 260
(“tenure” and “sdtenure” variables nos. 180 & 182).
278
These data are from the JUDICIAL CODEBOOK, supra note 260 (recoded from the “select”
variable no. 150 to isolate partisan elections).
279 These data are from the JUDICIAL CODEBOOK, supra note 260 (recoded from the “select”
variable no. 150 to isolate variations in retention methods).
280 Lindquist, supra note 33, at 182.
281 See id. (doing the same). These data are from the JUDICIAL CODEBOOK, supra note 260
(recoded from “structure” variable no. 129 to isolate courts with intermediate appellate court).
282 Lindquist, supra note 33, at 182.
283 Id.
284 Id.
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proxies for docket size.285 This strengthens the model by controlling for varying
degrees of opportunity to overrule precedent from state to state and from year to
year.
An ideological shift in the configuration of a court’s membership might also
be associated with increased overruling behavior.286 Indeed, scholars have
demonstrated this to be true for the U.S. Supreme Court.287 Consequently,
models exploring overruling behavior should account for ideological shifts. As
others have done, I use the “PAJID” scores developed by Paul Brace, et al. that
rank state court justice ideology based on various indicia, including citizen and
elite ideology at the time the judge took the bench, as well as party affiliation.288
The scores range from zero to one hundred with low scores indicating
conservatism and high scores indicating liberalism. To include this data in the
model, I followed Lindquist’s approach and calculated the “absolute ideological
change in the court’s median PAJID score from the previous year.”289
Similarly, a court’s fear of constitutional override might be affected by
ideological gaps between itself and override actors. Courts may fear override
more if they perceive a significant difference between their own ideological
preferences and those of actors with the power to override the court.290 Thus, I
include the absolute difference between each court’s median PAJID score and
the 100-point ideological score for citizens and state government ideologies
created by William Berry, et al.291 This value provides a measure of any gaps in
ideology between the courts and potential override actors.292 I also included a
measure of legislative professionalism, developed by Peverill Squire, because a

285 Id. These data are from the JUDICIAL CODEBOOK, supra note 260 (“pop” and “urban”
variable nos. 7 and 12). A few years of population data was missing. I added that information
from the same sources as used by the Judicial Codebook.
286 Lindquist, supra note 33, at 179-82.
287 E.g., id. (citing SAUL BRENNER & HAROLD SPAETH, STARE INDECISIS: THE ALTERATION
OF PRECEDENT ON THE SUPREME COURT, 1946-1992 (1995)).
288 See generally Paul Brace, Laura Langer & Melinda Gann Hall, Measuring the
Preferences of State Supreme Court Judges, 62 J. POL. 387 (2000).
289 Lindquist, supra note 33, at 179-82. I used the raw PAJID scores as reported in the
JUDICIAL CODEBOOK, supra note 260 (“medideol” variable no. 60), to create a variable with
absolute difference in score from the prior year.
290 See Epstein & Jacobi, supra note 40, at 353.
291 See generally William D. Berry, et al., Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in
the American States, 42 AM. J. POL. 327 (1998). These data are from the JUDICIAL CODEBOOK,
supra note 260.
292 Citizen ideology is relevant because of the initiative and referendum pathways for state
constitutional amendments, see id. at 327-28, which apply in some form in all states except
Delaware. DEL. CONST. art. XVI, § 1; see Dinan, supra note 22, at 4. Elite ideology is relevant
because it captures the ideology of government officials representing the legislature and the
governor. See Berry, supra note 291, at 327-28.
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professional legislature might impact the exercise of judicial review by limiting
obvious and direct conflicts between statutes and the constitution.293
Finally, I include two control variables for the age of each state constitution
because older constitutions will likely have generated a larger pool of cases
vulnerable to being overruled.294 I also include the number of words in each
constitution because constitution length is a proxy for constitutional detail,
which may impact judicial activism as described above.295 Appendix B provides
summary statistics for all variables included in the model.
The results of both the fixed and random effects models are shown in Tables
1 and 2 respectively.

293 See Lindquist, supra note 33, at 182-83. These data are from the JUDICIAL CODEBOOK,
supra note 260 (“legprof_squire” variable no. 104).
294 I calculated these data using the ratification years listed for each state constitution in
Dinan, supra note 22, at 11-12 tbl.1.1.
295 See supra Section II.B.3 (discussing how constitutional detail can impact judicial
review). These data are from the JUDICIAL CODEBOOK, supra note 260 (“const_length”
variable no. 123).
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Table 1. Fixed-Effects Negative Binomial Regression Model—Count of Overruling
Constitutional Precedent
Variable
Coef.
Std. Err.
P-Value
Amend. Rate
-0.5431197
0.183614
0.003
Amend. Rate Sq.
0.0652375
0.018956
0.001
Constitution Age
Constitution Length (words)

0.0012254
-0.0000758

0.004539
0.000129

0.787
0.557

Court Size
Clerks Per Justice
Av. Tenure of Justices
Av. Tenure of Justices (SD)

0.3435577
-0.292045
-0.0327221
0.0036878

0.104033
0.262311
0.021166
0.02492

0.001
0.266
0.122
0.882

0.8078193

0.351972

0.022

1.876891
6.169826
5.756942

3.31652
3.594255
3.5905

0.571
0.086
0.109

Court Ideological Change
Intermediate App. Ct.
Leg. Professionalism (Squire)
Ideological Gap (Court to Citizens)
Ideological Gap (Court to St. Gov.)

0.0110671
-0.2521064
-1.220459
-0.0111422
0.0087847

0.004807
0.202865
1.176727
0.004821
0.005085

0.021
0.214
0.3
0.021
0.084

Population
Urbanization

-0.0000457
0.0064633

3.35E-05
0.018244

0.172
0.723

Partisan Judicial Election
Retention Process - Ref. = Leg. Ret.
Governor
Non-Partisan Elec.
Retention Elec. or Partisan Elec.

_cons

0.4264793
3.352808
Observations = 1820 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 Wald chi2(19) = 64.90

0.899
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Table 2. Random-Effects Negative Binomial Regression Model—Count of Overruling
Constitutional Precedent
Variable
Coef.
Std. Err.
P-Value
Amend. Rate
-0.27904
0.138642
0.044
Amend. Rate Sq.
0.041028
0.014363
0.004
Constitution Age
Constitution Length (words)

0.001041
0.000017

0.001549
6.63E-06

0.502
0.01

Court Size
Clerks Per Justice
Av. Tenure of Justices
Av. Tenure of Justices (SD)

0.076444
0.144279
-0.04879
0.007679

0.054881
0.095789
0.020878
0.024046

0.164
0.132
0.019
0.749

Partisan Judicial Election
Retention Process - Ref. = Leg. Ret.
Governor
Non-Partisan Elec.
Retention Elec. or Partisan Elec.

0.198396

0.212538

0.351

0.122446
0.952117
0.686598

0.40221
0.358992
0.358704

0.761
0.008
0.056

Court Ideological Change
Intermediate App. Ct.
Leg. Professionalism (Squire)
Ideological Gap (Court to Citizens)
Ideological Gap (Court to St. Gov.)

0.011204
-0.17724
-0.00662
-0.00986
0.006898

0.004813
0.161172
0.721164
0.004611
0.004866

0.02
0.271
0.993
0.032
0.156

Population
Urbanization

1.16E-05
0.003855

1.96E-05
0.007022

0.555
0.583

_cons

0.456931
1.039399
Observations = 1820 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 Wald chi2(16) = 72.150

0.66

These results show several independent variables that are statistically
significant. For present purposes, however, the most significant association is
between constitutional amendment rates and the rate of overturning
constitutional precedent. The statistical significance of amendment rate squared
suggests a nonlinear relationship between amendment frequency and overruling
frequency. Figures 4 (fixed effects) and 5 (random effects) illustrate the
relationship by plotting the predicted overruling frequency based on amendment
rate and its square (while holding all other variables at their means). Confidence
intervals at the 90% level are separately illustrated.
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Figure 4. Predicted Frequency of Overruling—Fixed Effects Model
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Figure 5. Predicted Frequency of Overruling—Random Effects Model
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This association is surprising in light of prevailing theories regarding the
relationship between formal amendment and judicial activism, which suggest a
linear relationship where judicial activism decreases as amendment frequency
increases. My model suggests that the prevailing hypothesis may be roughly
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true, but only to a point. In my model, when a constitution’s amendment rate is
between 0 and 4.2 amendments per year (3.4 in the random effects model),
judicial activism decreases as amendment frequency increases. This is consistent
with conventional ideas. However, when amendment frequency passes 4.2
amendments per year (3.4 in the random effects model), judicial activism begins
to accelerate as amendment frequency increases.296 After this “tipping point,”
the relationship between judicial activism and amendment frequency is the
inverse of prevailing theories. Rather than corresponding with greater judicial
restraint, high amendment rates reliably correspond with increased judicial
activism.297
The confidence intervals for these estimates are wide, however, so they come
with a degree of caution, and further investigation is surely warranted.
Nevertheless, these results offer evidence challenging existing notions regarding
the relationship between amendment frequency and judicial decision-making on
constitutional issues. They suggest that judges may react to textual volatility in
ways that are very different from what we currently anticipate. Most
importantly, they suggest that amendment frequency may not be an effective
way to restrain the power of judicial review. Indeed, my model suggests that
constitutional designers seeking to restrain courts can undermine their objective
if they make a constitution too difficult to amend. Finding the “tipping point” in
any given context might be the key to designing amendment rules that
effectively restrain courts in their practice of judicial review.
Tables 1 and 2 show that there are other variables that reliably predict the
frequency with which a court might overturn constitutional precedent. Both the
fixed effects and random effects models suggest that an ideological shift in a
court’s median justice reliably predicts overruling behavior. As the size of the
ideological shift increases, the likelihood of a court overruling a past precedent
increases. This positive correlation is relatively slight, but it nevertheless
suggests that judicial ideology influences respect for constitutional norms.
Similarly, both the fixed effects and random effects models suggest that courts
are less likely to overturn a constitutional precedent as the ideological gap
between the court and citizens grows. This finding is consistent with
assumptions related to override threats. To the extent citizen ideology is a proxy

296 In my dataset, California, Georgia, Hawaii, Louisiana, and Texas have all experienced
average annual amendment rates near or above these ranges from time to time. The maximum
average annual amendment rates for those states are: California (4.07), Georgia (6.82), Hawaii
(3.38), Louisiana (10.08), and Texas (3.38).
297 To test the prevailing hypothesis of a linear relationship more directly, I replicated my
model without the square of the amendment-rate variable. The results for both the fixed effects
and random effects model show that amendment rate is not a statistically significant
independent variable when analyzed as a linear predictor. However, both models produced
positive linear coefficients for the amendment-rate variable, indicating that judicial activism
increases as amendment frequency increases.
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for potential override actions (perhaps by citizen initiatives or legislative
kowtowing to citizen preferences), the models suggest that courts may be less
inclined to disturb the constitutional status quo when the court’s preferences
diverge from citizen preferences.
The fixed effects model also suggests that partisan elections may reliably
predict overruling behavior. All else being equal, courts where justices are
subject to partisan elections are more likely to overrule constitutional precedent
than courts where the justices are not subject to partisan elections. This finding
is consistent with prior findings that elected judges are generally more willing
to overrule precedent.298
This model is not perfect. It contains a few noteworthy limitations. First, it
does not fully account for possible interactions between control variables that
might more accurately predict overruling behavior or otherwise influence the
model. Second, some of the control variables besides amendment frequency may
also have nonlinear relationships with the dependent variable. There are multiple
plausible permutations of the model in this regard. Finally, like any predictive
model, there is the possibility that other reliable predictors exist that the model
has not adequately addressed. These limitations highlight the need for continued
research in this area. Nevertheless, the model provides at least a starting point
for investigating the relationship between amendment frequency and the practice
of judicial review, and it surely casts doubt on the prevailing assumption that
amendment frequency has a limiting effect on judicial activism.299
IV. EXPLANATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
The above findings present somewhat of a puzzle. Amendment frequency
reliably predicts judicial restraint, but only up to a point. Once constitutions
become too easy to amend, judges are more likely to make their own
constitutional changes by overturning constitutional precedent. In this Section,
I suggest a few possible explanations for this and briefly discuss how these
findings might implicate current theories of constitutional design. My goal is not
to exhaust these issues here but to raise a few ideas for consideration and further
research.

298

See Lindquist, supra note 33, at 185-86.
Scholars have also suggested that amendment frequency can have a restraining effect
on legislatures. See, e.g., John Dinan, Law & Politics in the Age of Direct Democracy: State
Constitutional Initiative Processes and Governance in the Twenty-First Century, 19 CHAP. L.
REV. 61, 74-75 (2016). The idea is that frequent amendment, especially amendments
conducted by citizen initiative, can facilitate legislative accountability and reduce agency
costs. Political scientists have developed various measures of legislative accountability that
might be used to investigate whether amendment frequency (especially amendment by
initiative) reliably correlates with legislative accountability. In future work, I plan to
investigate this hypothesis empirically by drawing on data from state legislatures and state
constitutions. I am currently developing this empirical inquiry.
299
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Possible Explanations

My findings suggest that existing theories have overlooked certain dynamics
that influence how judges decide constitutional cases. Why then, at least from
the standpoint of strategic analysis, would judges become more active when a
constitution has an exceptionally high amendment rate. A few preliminary
thoughts are appropriate.
First, several scholars have made normative arguments in favor of courts
being more active when interpreting a frequently amended constitution.300 These
scholars suggest that judges should be less fearful of breaking new ground when
their rulings can be easily corrected by amendment.301 The intuition is that
frequent amendment lowers the stakes of constitutional adjudication, so judges
can be more progressive and creative in their rulings.302 This is especially true,
as the argument goes, for rulings that would expand constitutional rights because
any countermajoritarian problem created by a court ruling can easily be
corrected by constitutional amendment.303
Although these arguments are explicitly normative, they may provide insight
into my empirical findings.304 It is possible that exceptionally high amendment
rates have a destabilizing effect on constitutional entrenchment and undermine
predictability in the law. If this is true, then the strategic judge might recalibrate
his expectations when deciding constitutional cases. Rather than issue rulings
that accommodate override actors so that a ruling becomes entrenched in
constitutional law, the judge might conclude that, because the override threat is
unpredictable, she has no reason to accommodate the preferences of override
300 See, e.g., A.E. Dick Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the
Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873, 939 (1976); Conor O’Mahony, If a Constitution is Easy to
Amend, Can Judges be Less Restrained? Rights, Social Change, and Proposition 8, 27 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 191, 192 (2014); Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State
Constitutions in the Federal Courts, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 1409, 1453 (1999) (“[T]heir greater
accountability might render state judges more willing to read state constitutional guarantees
expansively.”); Lawrence Schlam, State Constitutional Amending, Independent
Interpretation, and Political Culture: A Case Study in Constitutional Stagnation, 43 DEPAUL
L. REV. 269, 285-86 (1994).
301 See, e.g., O’Mahony, supra note 300, at 192.
302 Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State Constitutional Law, 84 S. CAL. L. REV.
323, 358 (2011) (“It is possible that the political accountability of state judges (and the
amendability of state constitutions) might encourage them to read state constitutions more
expansively, knowing that their rulings can always be ‘corrected’ by a democratic majority.”).
303 See, e.g., O’Mahony, supra note 300, at 192, 228.
304 The only empirical suggestions of this nature that I could find were passing statements
by Stephen Holmes and Cass Sunstein as well as Joseph Blocher. See Holmes & Sunstein,
supra note 149, at 279-80 (arguing that “[i]f it is easy to amend the Constitution, the stakes
of constitutional decision are lowered,” which “may embolden the court”); see also Blocher,
supra note 302, at 358 (“[T]he political accountability of state judges (and the amendability
of state constitutions) might encourage them to read state constitutions more expansively.”).
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actors. In that scenario, the judge has an incentive to “swing for the fences” by
issuing rulings that fully realize her ideological preferences in the hope that if
the ruling is lucky enough to escape the chaotic and unpredictable override risk,
it will maximize the judge’s ideological preferences.
Second, it is possible that when constitutions are amended frequently, judges
view their roles differently. Many judges understand the judiciary’s role,
especially when exercising the power of judicial review, as being a referee
between majoritarian preferences and basic minority protections. When a
constitution is very rigid, the court can invoke the constitution as a basis for
pushing back on political actions taken by the political branches. However, when
a constitution is amended incredibly frequently and presumably leveraged by
majorities through those amendments, courts may have to engage in more
activist tactics if they wish to defend minority interests.305 This explanation is
rather substantive in that is assumes a common ideology for judges, but it may
explain why judges behave differently than excepted under incredibly flexible
constitutions.
Another possible explanation is that amendment frequency may somehow
increase opportunities for courts to exercise the power of judicial review. Gabriel
Negretto has theorized that frequent formal amendment might catalyze the
exercise of judicial review because frequent additions to the constitutional text
provide courts with new rules to invoke when reviewing legislation and
executive action.306 Negretto suggests that when a constitution is easy to amend,
court rulings based on judicial review will likely instigate responsive
amendments, which then will provide new grounds for judicial review of the
political branches, and which can start the cycle all over.307 In this way, frequent
amendment might proliferate how frequently a court uses the power of judicial
review, and explain why some courts operating under flexible constitutions
appear to be more active than courts operating under more rigid texts.308

305

See, e.g., O’Mahony, supra note 300, at 192.
See Gabriel L. Negretto, Replacing and Amending Constitutions: The Logic of
Constitutional Change in Latin America, 46 LAW & SOC. REV. 749, 761-62 (2012).
307 Negretto describes his proliferation theory this way:
[I]f courts have strong powers of judicial review and the constitution is easily amendable,
judicial interventions may increase amendments by Congress since legislators would
often resort to this mechanism to overcome controversial judicial interpretations. In
addition, a constitution that incorporates substantive policies may encourage both
amendments to incorporate policy shifts and frequent judicial interventions to decide on
the constitutionality of legislation.
Id. at 761.
308 This theory is interesting when used to assess my data gathering. Because I focused
only on explicit overruling of constitutional precedent, and excluded all instances where the
court suggested that the overruling was necessitated by intervening constitutional
amendments, it is possible that my dataset already accounts for Negretto’s proliferation
theory. That is, to the extent Negretto’s theory suggests that increased use of judicial review
306
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In any event, my data demonstrate the salience of these new lines of inquiry
and reveal how little we currently know about the institutional interaction
between amendment frequency and the practice of judicial review.
B.

Constitutional Design Implications

Whatever the explanation, my findings are significant for the practice and
study of constitutional design for at least three reasons. First, they suggest that
the relationship between amendment frequency and judicial restraint is unlikely
to be an inverse linear relationship. It is more likely that amendment frequency
and judicial review have a curvilinear relationship of some kind. This means that
constitutional designers must be mindful of a tipping point in amendability that
might cause their amendment processes to have unintended consequences.
Specifically, when constitutional designers craft amendment processes to
restrain courts, those processes need to be flexible enough that judges can
anticipate override threats, but not so flexible that frequent amendment has the
unintended consequence of facilitating greater judicial involvement in
constitutional change.
Second, my findings leave unanswered whether courts might behave
differently based on the subject matter under review. It is plausible, for example,
that courts might be more active when deciding issues related to individual rights
than when deciding structural issues. I plan to pursue this line of inquiry in future
work, but it is worth noting here that constitutional designers seeking to use
amendment rules to influence the practice of judicial review may need to account
for the possibility that courts behave differently when deciding different
constitutional questions.
Finally, my findings point to other variables besides amendment frequency
that are associated with judicial activism. Perhaps the most meaningful of these
from a constitutional design perspective is judicial selection processes. This
finding draws attention to the interdependent dynamics of constitutional design.
Constitutional performance is rarely monolithic or one-dimensional. There are
many interactions between institutions, actors, and laws that drive constitutional
performance. My findings suggest that efforts to restrain judges are incredibly
complex endeavors that require careful attention. Designing amendment rules
should not be done in isolation from other design considerations. Moreover,
design theories that fail to consider complex interactions, or at least recognize
this reality, should be treated with suspicion.

is not indicative of judicial activism per se, but simply increased opportunities to practice
judicial review that are created by frequent amendment, I may have already excluded cases
where courts are exercising judicial review primarily because of new textual insertions that
require them to do so.
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CONCLUSION
Constitutional change is an incredibly complex but important field. We once
knew very little about how constitutions could direct and manage deep political
change. As our knowledge continues to grow, constitutional designs will
hopefully be improved. The study of amendment rules is an important part of
this evolution. This Article will hopefully advance the field by drawing attention
to the complicated empirical relationship between amendment frequency and
judicial decision-making. It will also hopefully correct simplistic notions about
how to use amendment rules to restrain judges.

124

[Vol. 98:55

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Appendix A. Aggregate Count Data Summary
State

Avg.
Amend.
Rate

Avg.
Const.
Overrule

Avg. NonConst.
Overrule

Const.
Overrule
Total

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma (Civil)
Oklahoma (Crim.)
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas (Civil)
Texas (Crim.)

1.6403676
0.65185227
1.3460732
0.94948596
3.95999
0.92420028
0.79173499
1.1078617
2.1946065
3.3505139
2.5255851
1.0411692
0.20571548
0.25629897
0.34002314
0.63679628
0.28461676
3.3967517
0.88314842
1.5672826
0.53683472
0.59998918
0.83574651
0.75434559
1.4402792
0.72440073
1.6058489
0.79746961
0.38272252
0.83592866
1.4542502
2.1600852
1.3278486
1.1794685
1.0041668
1.4935535
1.4935535
1.3828177
0.77819237
0.33225634
1.1365893
0.94909833
0.24086932
2.6205042
2.6205042

0.88571429
0.31428573
0.54285717
0.45714286
1.1714286
0.54285717
0.05714286
0.05714286
0.45714286
0.42857143
0.17142858
0.22857143
0.25714287
0.17142858
0.17142858
0.2
0.42857143
0.54285717
0.17142858
0.08571429
0.2
0.62857145
0.17142858
0.31428573
0.37142858
0.62857145
0.25714287
0.2
0.37142858
0.22857143
0.42857143
0.2857143
0.14285715
0.11428571
0.6857143
0.34285715
0.51428574
0.45714286
0.22857143
0.08571429
0.34285715
0.31428573
0.2857143
0.22857143
1.0285715

4.7142859
1.6857142
2.3428571
2.3428571
2.8
2.0857143
2.4285715
0.74285716
2.0285714
5.742857
1.4857143
2.1714287
1.8285714
2.2857144
3.8
2.1428571
4.8000002
2.3714285
0.97142857
1.3714286
1.6571429
3.1714287
1.9142857
3.8571429
2.3714285
5.6571426
4.4571428
3.2571428
1.0285715
1.2285714
2.9714286
1.0857143
2.5142858
1.1428572
4.1999998
2.3142858
3.7428572
2.8857143
2.8857143
1.0571429
2.5428572
1.3428571
1.8571428
1.7714286
8.4285717

31
11
19
16
41
19
2
2
16
15
6
8
9
6
6
7
15
19
6
3
7
22
6
11
13
22
9
7
13
8
15
10
5
4
24
12
18
16
8
3
12
11
10
8
36

NonConst.
Overrule
Total
165
59
82
82
98
73
85
26
71
201
52
76
64
80
133
75
168
83
34
48
58
111
67
135
83
198
156
114
36
43
104
38
88
40
147
81
131
101
101
37
89
47
65
62
295
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Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
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0.80700684
0.25611112
0.96970414
0.77930668
0.48981252
0.83881272
0.54103076

0.34285715
0.02857143
0.14285715
0.54285717
0.6857143
0.22857143
0.2

2.1714287
2
0.97142857
4.0857143
4.4571428
3.0285714
1

Appendix B. Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Obs.
Count
1820

Mean
0.353297

Std. Dev.
0.655601

Amend Rate
Amend Rate Sq.

1820
1820

1.181215
2.367414

Constitution Age
Constitution Length

1820
1820

Court Size
Clerks Per Justice
Av. Tenure of Justices
Av. Tenure of Justices
(SD)

12
1
5
19
24
8
7

Min

76
70
34
143
156
106
35

Max
0

4

0.986245
6.287621

0
0

10.08163
101.6393

89.5978
20217.31

50.54404
12741.34

1
5200

224
65400

1820
1820
1820
1820

6.481319
2.066484
7.942643
5.271795

1.416615
0.94603
3.125612
2.590203

3
1
0
0

9
6
23.33333
14.31666

Partisan Judicial Election

1820

0.247253

0.431534

0

1

Retention Process
Legislature
Governor
Non-Partisan Elec.
Retention Elec. or
Partisan Elec.

Ref
1820
1820
1820

Ref
0.141209
0.251099
0.530769

Ref
0.348333
0.433765
0.49919

Ref
0
0
0

Ref
1
1
1

Court Ideological
Change
Intermediate App. Ct.
Leg. Professionalism
(Squire)
Ideological Gap (Court
to Citizens)
Ideological Gap (Court
to St. Gov.)

1820

2.269215

7.491386

0

58.12

1820
1820

0.695055
0.2062

0.460511
0.118016

0
0.027

1
0.659

1820

16.09288

12.40804

0.03176

63.86565

1820

19.26671

11.95506

0.00848

55.21853

Population
Urbanization

1820
1820

5073.73
68.65797

5449.098
14.32403

303
32.2

35841
94.4

